



Hedayah  
countering violent extremism

# UNDERMINING VIOLENT EXTREMIST NARRATIVES IN EAST AFRICA A HOW-TO GUIDE

SARA ZEIGER  
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**UNDERMINING VIOLENT EXTREMIST NARRATIVES  
IN EAST AFRICA**  
A HOW-TO GUIDE

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## ABOUT THIS GUIDE

This Guide is the follow-on product of the “Expert Workshop on East and Horn of Africa Collection of Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)”, held 5-7 February 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda. The workshop and How-To Guide are funded through the support of the U.S. Department of State.

This Guide and the annex of counter-narratives are available and accessible through Hedayah’s existing Counter-Narrative Library ([www.cn-library.com](http://www.cn-library.com)). For more information on the project, please see Annex A. For access to the Counter-Narrative Library, please contact [cnlibrary.admin@hedayah.ae](mailto:cnlibrary.admin@hedayah.ae).

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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## EXPERTS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

This How-To Guide could not have been drafted without the insights and contributions from the group of experts that attended the workshop in Kigali, Rwanda. The experts contributed to the workshop through presentations and discussions that shaped this Guide and populated it with examples of counter/alternative narratives. These experts are:

<b>Fauziya Abdi</b> <i>UN Development Program</i>	<b>Sami Gathii</b> <i>YADEN East Africa, Kenya</i>	<b>Martha Nghambi</b> <i>Global Peace Foundation, Tanzania</i>
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<b>Abdi Billow</b> <i>WAJIR Peace and Development Agency, Kenya</i>	<b>Nuwagaba Muhsin Kaduyu</b> <i>Allied Muslim Youth Uganda</i>	<b>Murat Uzunparmak</b> <i>Hedayah</i>
<b>Chris Chant</b> <i>Adam Smith International</i>	<b>Chris Maitland</b> <i>Australian Embassy, Ethiopia</i>	<b>Emmanuel Wakana</b> <i>Youth Empowerment and Leadership Initiative, Burundi</i>
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## INTRODUCTION

Terrorism and violent extremism have been a problem in East Africa<sup>1</sup> over the course of the past several decades. This problem has manifested from ethnic, religious, social, economic, cultural and tribal conflicts. The diversity of the region has at times contributed to the worsening of factors leading to radicalization and violence, but at other times has helped to build community resilience and to foster transitions from conflicts to peace.

The most recent and pressing threat in the region continues to be Al-Shabaab, based out of Somalia but with evidence of operating also in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. After a truck bomb exploded in Mogadishu in October 2017, killing over 350 people, it is clear that Al-Shabaab will not disappear as a threat to the region in the near future (“This was not ‘just another bomb,’” 2017). From a lens of preventing and countering violent extremism, undermining the radicalization and recruitment narratives of Al-Shabaab is highly important to the region.

At the same time, there are a number of localized conflicts that have the potential of manifesting in violent extremist activity in the region. Moreover, inconsistent national politics and freedom of movement have allowed different factions of rebel and violent extremist groups to form even across borders. For example, a Uganda-born rebel movement, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is operating out of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and recruiting individuals across the Western border of Uganda. Considered a terrorist group by the Ugandan government, the ADF was initially founded in religious ideology (Islamic) but has since morphed to include political ideology as part of their recruitment efforts. Still a threat to the DRC and the Ugandan government, the ADF is suspected of conducting an attack in Semuliki, DRC, in 2017 (“RDC: Mandats d’Arrêt,” 2018).

In other countries, swift political changes have created scenarios for new violence to potentially emerge. For example, in Burundi in 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would run for a third term in office, sparking protests across the country. One month later, a coup led by Major General Godefroid Niyombare attempted to oust the President unsuccessfully. While the political negotiations to change the term limits of the Presidency have resulted in some constitutional changes, violence has manifested in political protests throughout the country—with several attacks in Bujumbura occurring throughout summer 2017 (“Three killed in Burundi grenade attack,” 2017).

Historically speaking, East Africa has also been susceptible to several violent conflicts and violent extremist groups. For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was a key threat to Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the mid-1990’s. Under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA wanted to ultimately establish a democracy based on the Ten Commandments. However, the LRA is also historically ethnic Acholi from northern Uganda, meaning there are ethnic tensions affiliated with its political goals. Most well-known worldwide, the violent genocide perpetrated by the Hutu government against the Tutsi in Rwanda in the mid-1990’s serves as an extreme example of massive loss of life and the potential dangers of violent extremism. Finally, in the 1970’s a violent military junta, the Derg, plagued Ethiopia with a genocide in what was known as the Qey Shibir or “Red Terror,” where political opponents of the Marxist-Leninist group in power were killed *en masse* (“Mengistu is handed life sentence,” 2007).

<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this report, the region includes Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, South Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda.

Given both the current and historical context of East Africa and its complexities, it is important to stop the spread of messages of hate, violence, violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region, and instead provide alternative approaches to overcome conflict and tensions between different groups. Moreover, in an age where internet and social media play a significant role in the lives of young people susceptible to violent extremism, it should be noted that in the context of East Africa, the majority of the recruitment in the region is still taking place “offline” (UNDP, 2017). This means that counter-narratives and alternative narratives for the efforts of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) need to include components that materialize on traditional forms of media, or take place in a face-to-face setting.

The aim of this How-To Guide is to provide practitioners, civil society organizations and policymakers engaging in the space of counter-messaging and counter/alternative narratives with a tool to better enhance and amplify the messages against violent extremism in East Africa. The Guide includes a detailed list of open-source counter-narratives and alternative narratives that are culturally and socially resonant and relevant to the variety of contexts and countries in East Africa (See Annex B). The languages of the narratives in the collection include Arabic, English, French, Kirundi, Somali, and Swahili.

This Guide was developed using a mixed methodological approach through two core components. First, the relevant counter-narratives, good practices and case studies were collated through recommendations from a group of experts that convened in Kigali, Rwanda from the 5-7 February 2018 at an “Expert Workshop on East and Horn of Africa Collection of Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).” The workshop was hosted by Hedayah and the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). Second, the author of the report conducted desk research to supplement context, content and theoretical frameworks in this Guide. It should be noted that the present How-To Guide takes a similar format and structure from two previous reports by Hedayah, *Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide* (Zeiger, 2016), and *Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in Middle East and North Africa: A How-To Guide* (El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017). The previously devised framework relied on a development process that included inputs from counter-narrative experts, academics and government officials, and underwent a peer review process, and therefore provides a good foundation for this and additional How-To Guides in the series.

## WHAT IS “COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM” (CVE)?


In the spectrum of counter-terrorism approaches, the “soft” or “preventive” strategies, policies and programs that identify and challenge the “push” and “pull” factors of radicalization and recruitment are described as “countering violent extremism” or CVE programs and policies.

For the purposes of this How-to Guide, CVE describes both the longer-term prevention strategies that address potential macro socioeconomic and political factors, and the specifically designed targeted interventions that take place at both the community and individual level (to include psycho-social counseling for at-risk individuals as well as detainees) (Original text box from Zeiger, 2016).



# DEVELOPING A COUNTER-NARRATIVE

In accordance with Hedayah’s previous series of “How-To Guides,” there are 9 steps to developing a counter-narrative for CVE (Zeiger, 2016):



## 1 UNDERSTAND AND ASSESS RELEVANT PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

For any P/CVE intervention, including those in the counter-narrative space, the first step to the process is to understand the local context and local drivers of radicalization. In East Africa, there are some very particular factors that lead an individual towards violent extremism, and due to the diverse nature of society it is all the more relevant to assess the local drivers of radicalization at a community level before designing any counter-narrative campaign.

In order to illustrate this concept for the region of East Africa, previous How-To Guides have utilized the USAID (2011) model of identifying “push” factors and “pull” factors. However, it should be noted that there has been recent literature by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that has defined these drivers of radicalization as “structural drivers,” “individual incentives,” and “enabling factors” (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016, p. 10). As such, in the below framework, all three categories are used to more articulately differentiate the individual and psychological “pull” towards terrorism that are internal attractions compared to the external factors that may facilitate a faster recruitment process. This is particularly important for the context of East Africa where historically speaking, charismatic leaders such as Joseph Kony are especially important in recruiting new followers and maintaining the support of the group.

The chart below summarizes the main drivers of radicalization in East Africa. It should be noted that there have been a number of significant studies investigating the drivers of radicalization in different East African country contexts. Therefore, the chart comprises of information from two sources: 1) the discussions on drivers of radicalization during the Expert Workshop in Kigali; and 2) key drivers indicated in relevant literature coming out of East Africa. This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead shows the diversity in types of factors that may lead to radicalization and recruitment to various terrorist groups and militant groups in the region.

It is important to determine the main causes or drivers of radicalization in the region or locality before designing any CVE intervention, but in particular for counter-narratives for two main reasons: 1) to avoid the fallacy of incorrectly labeling a population as “vulnerable” without proper assessment; and 2) to correctly choose a target audience that might be most influenced by the counter-narrative.

PUSH FACTORS / STRUCTURAL MOTIVATORS	PULL FACTORS / INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES
<p><u>Political</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and their presence in Somalia;</li> <li>• Weak governance, especially in rural areas across East Africa (Dualeh, 2015);</li> <li>• Aggressive actions taken by security or police that exacerbate local grievances (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012);</li> </ul>	<p><u>Social /Psychological</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incentive to find a spouse due to prestige in a militant organization;</li> <li>• Revenge, for example for police brutality or execution of family member (Scofield Associates, 2017);</li> <li>• Ability to have a career (Botha, 2016);</li> </ul>

PUSH FACTORS / STRUCTURAL MOTIVATORS	PULL FACTORS / INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frustration with political system or lack of political influence;</li> <li>• Police profiling of minorities.</li> </ul> <p><u>Socio-economic</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marginalization of tribes, ethnicities or clans (e.g. Somalis and Kenyans) (Botha, 2016; Strasser, 2016);</li> <li>• Unemployment or poverty (Russell, 2017);</li> <li>• Lack of access to basic services and infrastructure;</li> <li>• Lack of education or access to education;<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• Expectation from society and the failure to meet these expectations (e.g. employment, housing);</li> <li>• Pressure from community to perform in a certain way;</li> <li>• Lack of network and support system of peers;</li> <li>• Income inequality and shifting socio-economic conditions in vulnerable neighborhoods. (Guha, 2017).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Idealization of violent extremist or terrorist due to lack of father figure (Botha, 2016);</li> <li>• Attractiveness of having access to a gun, a sign of power;</li> <li>• High exposure to violence (Small Arms Survey, 2017);</li> <li>• Attractiveness of power, status and opportunities within group.</li> </ul> <p><u>Religious/Ideological</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reward in the after-life for actions;</li> <li>• Political ideology, desire for reform and change.</li> </ul> <p><u>Economic and Consumer-Based Incentives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Physical rewards such as motorbikes or access to weapons;</li> <li>• Provision of basic services, food, shelter, medical and water;</li> <li>• Offering a hide-out and escape from authorities;</li> <li>• Access to drug and alcohol networks (Le Sage, 2014).</li> </ul>
ENABLING FACTORS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presence of radical preachers in mosques;<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• Peer-to-peer exchanges encouraging increased social status;</li> <li>• Charismatic leaders such as Joseph Kony in Uganda.</li> </ul>	

**Figure 1: Potential Push and Pull Factors in East Africa.**

*Note: This chart is for illustrative purposes and should not be considered a comprehensive list. Factors can differ across countries and between regions within the same country, and grievances can be real or perceived.*

<sup>2</sup> For example, in Uganda where the LRA members only had access to primary school education (80%) (Botha, 2015).

<sup>3</sup> For example, there have been calls to action by domestic supporters of Al-Shabaab such as the Pumwani Riyadh Mosque and the Muslim Youth Center near Eastleigh (starting in 2008) in Kenya. Reportedly these recruitment centers are no longer operating overtly, and radicalization has “gone underground” since 2012 (Odhiambo, E., Onkware, K., & Leshan, M, 2015).

## 2 IDENTIFY THE TARGET AUDIENCE

The next step in the process of developing a counter-narrative to violent extremism is to identify the main target audience your campaign wants to address. As mentioned in Hedayah’s first How-To Guides for South East Asia and Middle East and North Africa, this Guide takes a marketing approach that defines the target audience as the core and central component of the campaign (El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017). A description of the specific target audience should include age, gender, education level, localization, priority interests and online activities (Tuck & Silverman, 2016).

Defining the target audience is especially important in the context of East Africa, where manifestations of violent extremism and their narratives incorporate elements of different ethnicities, tribes, religions and social backgrounds. Moreover, the narratives utilized by violent extremists adapt to the local languages and dialects of each region, country and district within the country. For example, Al-Shabaab may start a video with Arabic to establish religious legitimacy, but then switch to Swahili or Somali for the targeted recruitment message. As such, a counter-narrative campaign designer should also consider the resonant language of the target audience they are trying to reach.

There is also a tendency to emphasize “youth” as a target audience for counter-narrative campaigns. However, as the experts at the workshop in Kigali pointed out, the category of “youth” is not a tailored target audience. Therefore, campaigns should have in mind the particular subset of youth they want to address and anticipate their needs and interests in the design process. This tactic is often used, for example, by Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions, the media arm of Al-Shabaab by matching the message to the needs and interests of the target audience and the grievances in the local community.<sup>4</sup> Some examples of different subsets of a “youth” population may include:

- Youth in the formal education system
- Youth who have dropped out of school
- Youth in urban areas versus youth in rural areas
- Youth who have been released from prison or were engaged in criminal networks
- Youth with families and no basic source of income
- Youth with education and no employment

It was noted at the Kigali workshop that youth that have participated in gangs or criminal activity were particularly susceptible to recruitment by groups such as Al-Shabaab. In this respect, Al-Shabaab sometimes uses the criminality of an individual to coerce or pressure that person to join their cause—threatening to expose them if they do not participate in terrorism.

In addition, the campaign designer should take into consideration what is considered “cool” in the community. One expert at the workshop indicated that effective violent extremist propaganda is “rebel cool” because it shows defiance and rebellion against governments. He gave the example of complaints from the local community when police do not confront protesters because it is “cool” to be seen as rebellious.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Presentation by Matthew Freear at Expert Workshop on “Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism in East and Horn of Africa,” February 2018, Kigali, Rwanda.

<sup>5</sup> Presentation by Sami Gathii at Expert Workshop on “Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism in East and Horn of Africa,” February 2018, Kigali, Rwanda.

### Types of Target Audiencees

<p><b>GENERAL AUDIENCE</b></p> <p>Counter-narratives aimed at a general audience may emphasize shared cultural or historical values, may underline common themes of humanity, or may emphasize peace, tolerance and solidarity (Briggs &amp; Feve, 2013). In the context of East Africa, campaigns aimed at a general audience may include participatory theatre, public concerts and public debates and dialogues. It is important to note here that the counter-narrative for a general audience should still be as localized as possible, and tailored to fit the needs of the community. The grievances and challenges a community faces will vary from country to country and region to region within the same country.</p>	<p><b>KEY INFLUENCERS</b></p> <p>This type of target audience refers to influential community actors such as tribal leaders, teachers, peer groups, family members or social workers. Key influencers are the individuals that have the best ability to impact “vulnerable” individuals. However, key influencers may lack knowledge of how to engage and counter-message. For example, mothers of victims of terrorist attacks may have powerful stories, but may not be trained on how to deliver their message. Therefore, campaigns aimed at key influencers can incorporate elements of building the knowledge and skills for message delivery.</p>
<p><b>SYMPATHIZERS</b></p> <p>This category refers to individuals who do not actively or publicly/vocally support violent extremism but may be sympathetic to some of the arguments made in terrorist propaganda due to cultural, social and historical context of the region. Sympathizers are passive in their support for violent extremism—they may not act when faced with messages of violent extremism, but silently agree with those messages. This category also includes individual that are “at risk” of radicalization or actively viewing terrorist propaganda online (Briggs &amp; Feve, 2013).</p>	<p><b>JUSTIFIERS</b></p> <p>The category of “justifiers” includes individual who actively justify the arguments and actions of terrorist groups in a public or semi-public way. This encompasses, for example, a preacher that actively supports military actions against the Somali government, including those violent actions taken by Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p><b>PERPETRATORS AND TERRORISTS</b></p> <p>The most challenging target audience to reach for counter-narratives as they are comprised of dedicated individuals that are actively participating in terrorism or inciting violent activities to achieve their political, ideological or religious objectives. In the context of East Africa, this would include terrorists captured and imprisoned by governments, or those convicted of a terrorist crime.</p>	

### 3 IDENTIFY THE EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The next step in the process is to identify the main message of violent extremist propaganda that the counter-message will address. The narrative that is countered can be either explicitly or directly addressed, or implicitly addressed (i.e. providing an alternative narrative or solution to a grievance).

Building on some of the modules presented through previous How-To Guides, the most relevant narratives of violent extremists from East Africa are:



It should be noted that in the examples below, some of the groups identified are not considered terrorist groups by international standards. However, the narratives of militant or insurgent groups are also extremely relevant for the context of East Africa, and therefore some of the relevant propaganda strategies of these organizations are described to better contextualize the narrative types given. It should also be noted that the narratives of violent extremists in East Africa are also adaptive and have changed over time—therefore it is important to consider the latest and changing narratives of violent extremism.<sup>6</sup>

#### Political and Military Narratives

The most common narratives utilized by violent extremists in East Africa to recruit and radicalize individuals use political and military justifications for exhorting violence. Several examples of political and military narratives are summarized below. However, this list should not be considered comprehensive, as the variety of violent extremist narratives in the East Africa region is large.

##### 1. Operational Capacity and Ability to Govern.

This narrative utilizes political arguments to suggest that the terrorist group is more credible as a governing body than the governments in East Africa. For example, prior to the elections in Kenya in June 2017, Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions, Al-Shabaab’s media arm, released a video titled “An Analysis of Events: A Message to the Muslims in Kenya” that emphasized Al-Shabaab’s abilities to obtain resources, territory and protect their own, implicitly suggesting the Kenyan government cannot govern appropriately (MEMRI, 2017). Similarly, in a video produced by Al-Shabaab after a January 2016 attack that killed over 100 troops, the focus of the video is on the vulnerability and defeat of the troops in the attacks, and the success of Al-Shabaab in that attack (PBS, 2016). A third example of this narrative strategy can be seen in the propaganda that was put out on Radio Andalus in mid-January 2013 after the failed rescue attempt of Denis Alex, a French hostage. The messages put out immediately after that attempts claimed: “victory in repelling the attack” and demonstrating its authority and capacity to operate (Sikorski, 2014).

Another example of political narratives is the Allied Democratic Forces manifesto that explained that the purpose of the movement was to overthrow the

<sup>6</sup> For a good review of the shifting tactics of Al-Shabaab in their media strategies for the past decade, see a report by Hate Speech International (Anzalone, 2016a).

Ugandan government, and warned that anyone supporting President Museveni would be killed or responsible for the targeted deaths of their family members (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012). Similarly, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has claimed that the social and economic inequalities faced by the population in Northern Uganda, and the inability of the government to provide basic services, were justifications for the rebellion (Jackson, 2002). Out of Rwanda, the rebel group "Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda" (FDLR) attempts to convince the Rwandan refugees living in the DRC that the Rwandan government is oppressing Hutus, and should therefore take up arms against the government ("Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda," 2015).

## 2. War against Islam.

The main narrative utilized by Al-Shabaab is to mobilize support for violent "jihad" against Western governments, Somali governments and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As Timothy Sikorski (2014, p. 10) puts it, this type of narrative involves "portraying the actions of Western nations, the Somali government, and AMISOM as being part of a larger war on Islam, with the governments in the Horn of Africa beholden to Western interests." It should be noted that Al-Shabaab's guerrilla war with Ethiopia has helped to support this claim, suggesting that the Ethiopians were "acting as puppets of the Western 'far enemy' intent on attacking Islam" (Ibid). This is evidenced further by propaganda videos throughout their existence that have featured encouragement of attacks and martyrdom against Western targets, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), AMISOM, or the Ethiopian military (Anzalone, 2016a). For this particular narrative, it remains to be seen what the effects might be of the AMISOM troop withdrawal on the propaganda tactics that are utilized by Al-Shabaab.

## 3. Establishment of a religious "State".

Particularly utilized by Al-Shabaab, this argument emphasizes the establishment of a state based on Islamic principles and "sharia" law. In a historical sense, Al-Shabaab takes its ideology partially from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was formed as a "pseudo-government providing some semblance of law and order through strict enforcement of sharia law in vast ungoverned areas of Somalia" (Sikorski, 2014, p. 10). According to a 2016 report, the "narratives in Al-Shabaab's films also promote the notion of an idyllic 'Islamic' polity capable of representing and defending the interests of Muslims domestically, regionally and globally" (Anzalone, 2016a, p. 10).

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda was also founded in the context of the Ugandan Mujahidin Freedom Fighters movement that retaliated against a 1992 Ugandan Supreme Court ruling and sought to establish an Islamic State free from discrimination against the Muslim population of Uganda (Weeraran-te, 2017).

It should be noted here that Daesh<sup>7</sup> propaganda, which is grounded in the formation of an Islamic "Caliphate" in Syria and Iraq, has also attempted to recruit East Africans. For example, a video in 2015 featured four Somalis and one Ethiopian that called Somalis to join Daesh, referring to their oppression by "Ethiopian Christians."<sup>8</sup> However, there has been the limited success of Daesh

<sup>7</sup> This report refers to the terrorist group as Daesh, an Arabic acronym for "ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi 'l-Iraq wa-sh-Sham" (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

<sup>8</sup> See "A Message to the Muslims in Somalia," Media Office of Wilayat al-Furat, released on May 21, 2015, in Anzalone, 2016a.

to recruit East Africans to join their cause, despite the high-profile defection of a predominant Al-Shabaab preacher in 2015 (Anzalone, 2016b).

In a similar manner, the ideological roots of the LRA can be traced to the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena, a spiritual and military movement that sought to purify the population and establish an alternative way of life. As Beevor (2017) noted, the subsequent vision of the LRA is more millenarian than the vision of Al Qaeda or Daesh, which is apocalyptic. In other words, the LRA believes they are they are "God's chosen Elect, destined to ensure that righteousness overcomes evil" (Rinehart, 2006, p. 23). Therefore the State narrative of the LRA is not for the common person—it is for a particular religious elite that is spiritually "pure." The members of this society were named the "Acholi Manyen" or "New Acholi" (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012, p. 65). According to Joseph Kony's supporters, the authority of his rule was justified based on the Ten Commandments and under the control of the "Holy Spirit" which according to his followers, possessed him (Beevor, 2017).

## Social and Personal Narratives

### 1. Coercion and forced recruitment.

In the context of East Africa, the idea of forced entry into a terrorist group or coercion should not be underestimated. Al-Shabaab often uses the threat of violence to intimidate populations but to also forcibly recruit new members. For example, in 2017, Al-Shabaab was reportedly meeting with clan members from Bay and Bakool in southwestern Somalia to identify children and meet with specific young people ages 9-18 to be educated and trained under Al-Shabaab leadership (Maruf, 2017). The United Nations recently expressed concern over a significant campaign by Al-Shabaab to recruit child soldiers in a 2017 letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (UN Security Council, 2017). However, this is not a recent phenomenon, as Al-Shabaab was reportedly abducting teenage girls to marry their fighters since 2010 (Spillus, 2012).

Historically speaking, the LRA often abducted Acholi children and inundated them to the group with psychological and physical threats. A regular practice was to have new abductees kill a member of their group. As Beevor (2017, p. 504) notes, "killing a companion makes the thought of returning home terrifying. There is also a spiritual impact. In Acholi cosmology, killing pollutes the killer with the cen, the spirit of the deceased, bringing the perpetrator terrible misfortune." According to interviews with former child soldiers, beatings were common amongst LRA abductees in order to establish fear and power structures (Veale & Stavrou, 2007). Moreover, the LRA commanders often threatened violence or death against family members of recruits that did not comply with the orders or requests from the group (Peel, 2015).

### 2. Attraction to violence or power.

Where social and economic opportunities are limited, another powerful narrative of terrorist and militant groups in the region is the attractiveness of violence or access to power. For example, experts at the Kigali workshop mentioned that young Kenyans had been said to have been recruited to Al Shabaab when they were provided with a motorcycle upon joining. The motorcycle was seen as a symbol of power, and gave the young Kenyan a certain status in society.



A similar claim was made by a research report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), that the ease of accessing weapons was part of what attracted youth to violent extremism: “Small arms can further be a status symbol and means of expressing power that attract the youth to resistance movements and crime” (Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010).

In the LRA, abductees eventually reported that they had a sense of satisfaction and respect as they gained their own credibility in the organization, and they were attracted to the political and spiritual power of their leader (Beevor, 2017). At the same time, according to interviews with former LRA members, good fighters were promoted through the ranks, so even if an individual was forcibly recruited by the LRA, they may eventually find meaning in violent acts as a way to gain power and authority within the group (Peel, 2015).

### Ethnic and Clan-Based Narratives

Violent extremist and militant groups in East Africa have capitalized on long-standing ethnic and tribal divisions within society as a way to gain support. The most obvious example would be from the Rwandan genocide separating the Hutu majority from the Tutsi minority—where perpetrators of the genocide justified killing the Tutsi based on ethnic and even physical indicators. Precursors to the genocide, Belgian colonists classified the Rwandan population as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa through measuring height, length of nose and eye shape (Fornace, 2009). Discrimination between different ethnic groups ensued over the course of the next 60 years, and despite the genocide not being entirely an ethnic issue, the ethnic narratives persevered over the course of history and were utilized to justify mass killings of Tutsi (and those who helped them) by the Hutu throughout the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s.

Al-Shabaab also takes advantage of ethnic differences in appealing to different audiences in its propaganda videos. For example, Al-Shabaab points to the historical separation by Western powers of Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the North West Frontier Province in Kenya, and couples this with modern-day discrimination of Muslims in both of those countries, as a way to identify grievances targeted at local communities (Anzalone, 2016a).

On a smaller scale, the ADF in western Uganda mobilized the remnants of the Rwenzururu movement and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), which capitalized on tensions within the local kingdom and the rejection of the power of the central Ugandan government by the Rwenzururu kingdom (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012). Later on, the ADF also adapted to the grievances of the host country (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and gained at least passive support from the Congolese in order to survive.

### Religious and Ideological Narratives

While several groups in East Africa utilize religious and ideological narratives to justify their political aims and their violent actions, the religious arguments based on theology are not necessarily the most persuasive to recruits in East Africa. A study conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) found that from those interviewed (which included samples from former Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram members), those that participated in violent extremism had significantly lower levels of religious education and less knowledge of the Qur’an than the control group (UNDP, 2017, pp. 49-50). In this regard, the study notes that

“dogma and indoctrination, rather than more in-depth religious study, influence susceptibility to recruitment” (Ibid, p. 50). Here it could be argued that the religious and ideological narratives used by Al-Shabaab, for example, do not necessarily utilize structured theological arguments to convince their population, but rather create an environment that permits violence based on spiritual and emotional persuasion. Several examples of religious and ideological arguments are indicated below:

#### 1. Righteousness and Elite Religious Authority.

This theme of being the religious elite cuts across several violent extremist groups in the region. In this regard, Al-Shabaab labels those who disagree with them as “infidels” or “apostates” which causes vulnerable individuals to doubt their own religious teaching (UNSOM, 2017). By claiming to have the moral religious authority, and by capitalizing on the lack of religious knowledge of the population (as mentioned above), Al-Shabaab is able to claim that their actions have the ultimate moral “high-ground.” This can also be seen through the promotion of strict religious rituals, enforced through religious punishment or “hudud” (Anzalone, 2016a).

In a similar manner, Kony’s followers in the LRA coupled violent death and destruction with righteousness. In his framework, torture was permissible because the aim was to “purify” the culture and population from “impure” religion and cultures.<sup>9</sup> Their religious and cultic rituals were also strictly enforced, with violators being subjected to extreme punishments, often death.

#### 2. Violent Offensive “Jihad”.

According to a 2016 report by Hate Speech International, the roots of Al-Shabaab’s ideology of “jihad” can be found in their 2008 “No Peace Except [by] Islam” campaign that promotes a narrow interpretation of the al-Anfal verse, permitting violence against the ‘enemies of God’ whenever and wherever possible (Anzalone, 2016).

Another religious argument refers to the concept of “jihad” as a way to call for action in support of fellow Muslims. For example, according to a former Kenyan Al-Shabaab member, Al-Shabaab recruiters made the individual feel that they were not a proper Muslim because they were not acting against the enemy that was attacking Muslims worldwide (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012). Similarly, a film documenting the Westgate Mall attack points out the discrimination of Muslims by the Kenyan government as one of the main reasons for the Westgate attack (Anzalone, 2016a).

#### 3. Migration to establish an Islamic State.

Particularly for Al-Shabaab, the group promotes the idea of performing “Hijrah” (migration) to join their group in Somalia. While this argument is slightly more relevant for those recruits to Al-Shabaab from the West, such as from the US or Europe, the concept still applies to the context of recruiting individuals from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia or Uganda. For example, a number of East African foreign fighters—including Kenyans and Tanzanians—have been featured in propaganda videos that are subtitled in Swahili, Arabic, and English, and there has been an increase in Swahili propaganda put out by Al-Shabaab since 2013

<sup>9</sup> According to an interview with Kenneth Bana, former LRA senior commander, in Beevor (2017).


(Anzalone, 2016b). According to Sikorski (2014), Al-Shabaab's concept of "Hijrah" is rooted in Al Qaeda ideology and is one of the reasons why Al-Qaeda has endorsed Al-Shabaab as taking part in their global jihad.

### Economic Narratives

Economic narratives can be seen in a number of different ways—to include the promise of cash rewards, access to materials or consumer goods, or opportunities for jobs or employment. All these tactics have been utilized by Al-Shabaab as ways to recruit young people to their organization. For example, a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) suggested that Al-Shabaab promised 40,000 Kenyan Shillings (500 USD) per month as a salary for group members, which is four times the national average at the time (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012). Al-Shabaab has also been reported to give out free phones as a way to entice potential recruits, which they then use to carry out the recruitment process (UNSOM, 2017). Moreover, participants at the Kigali workshop cited examples from Kenya where Al-Shabaab promised to handout motorcycles to those who would join their organization. Further, a study by the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) suggested that unemployment was a significant incentive for recruitment of Al-Shabaab because it creates both "an economic need and an excess of leisure time" (UNSOM, 2017, p. 15).

## 4 SET CLEAR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

After assessing the local context and main concern that the counter-narrative will address, the next step is to identify the goals and objectives of the counter-narrative and its campaign. The goals and objectives should outline clearly the change in attitude or behavior that is desired in the target audience. This target audience was identified in step 2. The below framework describes possible goals and objectives for the region of East Africa (Zeiger, 2016, p. 12; El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017, p. 14).



## MEASURING IMPACT OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

Defining appropriate goals for the counter-narrative is important for measuring its effectiveness. It may be useful to articulate the goals into smaller or more specific sub-goals that are measurable and realistic. It is also important to consider specific indicators that can be assessed and measured over time. For more about measuring the impact of the counter-narratives and campaigns, see Step 9.

### Case Study for Goals and Objectives


Watatu Film, Kenya

#### Description:

Watatu is a film that is set in Mombasa, Kenya that tells the story of three men involved in violent extremism: Yusuf, Salim, and Jack. Yusuf becomes radicalized by a violent extremist group, and his uncle Salim struggles to get him to reject the ideology of the group. Jack, a local policeman, attempts to gain Yusuf's trust to prevent him from conducting an attack. The film then turns to a theatre show, where live actors play out the remaining of the narrative, with input from the live audiences. The actors are given the opportunity to make decisions for the main characters to change the outcome of the story.

For more about Watatu, see SAFE Kenya's Website:

<http://safekenya.org/watatu/>



## 5 DETERMINE AN EFFECTIVE MESSENGER

After the goals and objectives of the counter-narrative are set, it is important to determine the messenger or messengers that will deliver the message. The experts at the workshop in Kigali emphasized that when considering a messenger, the personal attributes and characteristics such as the cultural, ethnic and religious background of the individual messenger needed to be taken into consideration.

### QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT MESSENGER

- What is the relationship between the messenger and the target audience?
- What is the credibility of that messenger with the target audience?
- What is the potential for that messenger to change attitudes?
- What is the potential for that messenger to change behaviors?
- What are the potential negative effects or risks associated with choosing that particular messenger?

*Original text from El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017.*

### Youth (Peer-to-Peer)

In the current context of East Africa, youth play a significant role in society and comprise a large portion of the population. According to a report from the African Union, over 60% of East Africa's population is under the age of 30 (Ababa, 2017). In fact, "Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen" (the formal name for Al-Shabaab) means "movement of the youth who strive or struggle," pointing out that Al-Shabaab is targeting young people to carry out their ideals. In addition, peers and social networks play critical roles in shaping identity and creating a sense of belonging—important mechanisms to strengthen in the context of preventing recruitment to violent extremist groups. As such, young leaders can be important instigators of positive change and help prevent their peers from joining terrorist organization.


An example of peer-to-peer messaging from the Burundian context is through [www.ivomo.net](http://www.ivomo.net). In this website, young people are able to start conversations with each other about topics that are important to them in their community. A similar example is through YADEN East Africa's Youth Platform of Opportunity. In this face-to-face platform, young people in Kenya are able to create a community, build a sense of belonging and identity together, build a system to access relevant opportunities for active change in their community, and create a space to create and share messages of change with each other.

A third example of youth as a messenger is through the Anti-Tribalism Movement's "Let them Hear Your Voice" campaign.<sup>10</sup> The campaign called for youth in Somalia to express their opinions about tribal divides in their communities that would be shown to presidential candidates during the elections. The result was that young people in Somalia produced 30-second videos expressing their proposed solutions to community grievances.

<sup>10</sup> The video for the "Let them hear your voice" campaign can be viewed on You Tube here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rh1jAucXv0Q>

### TESTING THE MESSENGER WITH A TARGET GROUP

If there is an opportunity to do so, it is recommended that you test the messenger with a selection of your target audience before conducting the campaign. This might be done through a focus group discussion. Testing how the messenger is perceived by the target audience can help avoid unanticipated consequences in the campaign or bring to light aspects of the messenger's characteristics that you can leverage in the campaign.



### Victims and Survivors

Victims and survivors of terrorist attacks, or the family members of victims of terrorism can be powerful messengers that appeal to the emotions of potential perpetrators by showing the negative consequences of terrorism. The model of leveraging the stories of victims and survivors is utilized in Rwanda and Burundi around genocide prevention and education. For example, in an art installation by Pieter Hugo, photographs of survivors of the Rwandan genocide paired with perpetrators of the violence are featured together with their personal narratives highlighting reconciliation and community forgiveness (Ruby & Taylor, 2014). Similarly, the Kigali Genocide Memorial features a room containing the clothing of some of the victims of the genocide, and a short video of the stories of several of the survivors and their experiences. Another example is an initiative by Never Again Rwanda, where “spaces for peace” bring together survivors and ex-perpetrators to discuss their experiences and understand each other’s situations. Those spaces are closed groups, but the experiences and stories are anonymously shared with outsiders as an example of reconciliation and for future prevention of genocide (Kezio-Musoke, 2017).

### Religious Leaders

Religious leaders have the potential to impact target audiences especially when the content is focused more on religious or ideological arguments. An example out of East Africa is a program conducted by the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCCPA) to train women, youth and religious leaders on counter-narrative content. In this training, participants learn about which religious messages are most effective in countering the religious arguments of Al-Shabaab, specifically focusing on the interpretations of “jihad,” “takfir,” “Jahiliyyah”<sup>11</sup> and other Islamic concepts as well as the claims that Al-Shabaab makes with respect to the Prophet and his companions.

In addition, religious leaders can be role models for interactions between sects or between religions in a tolerant and peaceful way. For example, a group of 300 Sufi clerics met in East Africa in 2015 to discuss violent extremism and release a statement against terrorism (Abdi, 2015). In a region where Sufi values are resonant also with local cultural and tribal traditions, the leadership of the Sufi clerics on this issue bears some significant impact on the community.

Experts at the Kigali workshop did reflect on the challenges to working with religious leaders on counter-messaging. In this regard, it was mentioned that sometimes religious leaders are not the most connected to the youth populations in East Africa, as many of the clerics are of an older generation. To overcome this challenge, the organization Allied Muslim Youth Uganda focuses on training and mentorship of young leaders, including facilitating an interfaith and inter-generational retreat to bring together student communities with religious leaders (Allied Muslim Youth Uganda, 2017). Another possible way to overcome this challenge is to build the knowledge and capacities of young religious leaders that may be more connected to the youth populations.

<sup>11</sup> “Jihad” refers to the Islamic concept of “struggle.” “Takfir” refers to the Islamic concept of declaring somebody a non-believer. “Jahiliyyah” refers to the Islamic concept of the period of time before Islam, when the world was “ignorant.”

### Formers and Defectors

Individuals who once participated in violent extremism and terrorism and that have exited the group have the potential to be powerful messengers to prevent others from joining (Ashour, 2010). A report by Neumann (2015) suggests that defectors from Daesh can deliver four key messages that are also applicable in the context of Al-Shabaab: 1) highlighting in-fighting and divisions within the group; 2) revealing the brutality against Muslims; 3) exposing the corruption and un-Islamic practices of the group; and 4) revealing the poor quality of life (Neumann, 2015). In the East African context, several young Kenyan girls were rescued by the Somalia National Army in 2017 and told the story of how the group’s leadership sexually abused them and held them in captivity. The girls, who initially joined out of their own free will, very quickly learned that the group was not what they had expected. According to 16-year-old Halima, “Al-Shabaab is just a marauding gang of killers. There is no Jihad in Somalia, I regret ever supporting them and leaving my family for them” (“Shabaab men turn Kenyan schoolgirls into sex slaves,” 2017).

In the Rwandan context, former FDLR fighters are incorporated into the narratives utilized by the Mutobo Demobilization and Reintegration camp to contact current fighters for the FDLR in the attempts to bring them back to Rwandan society. According to a senior former FDLR fighter, Brigadier General Semugeshe Comes, former members were crucial to his return home that “gave [him] assurances that all was well in Rwanda and that nothing would happen to [him]” (Mugabi, 2017).

### Grassroots and Community Actors

Grassroots organizations and community actors can be influential messengers because they are connected to the communities’ needs and grievances, and often address some of those grievances in their core work. In Tanzania, the Global Peace Foundation initiates counter-narrative campaigns that encourage the community to be non-violent, tolerant and peaceful. For example, the #VijanaNaAmani (Youth and Peace) campaign targeted identity-based conflict in the community by promoting stories of young people active in their communities.

However, it should be noted that in a study conducted by Search for Common Ground on key influencers and networks in Tanzania and Kenya, it was found that civil society members were the least influential of all the potential messengers, which included political leaders, police, religious leaders, classmates and teachers, workplace colleagues, families and peers (Russell, 2017). In this respect, civil society groups may be best placed to provide information and training to messengers that are more influential over the target audience but may not be best suited as a messenger themselves.

### Political Leaders

Political leaders can play a significant role in convincing the community that the governments in East Africa are successfully running the countries and fighting corruption, contrary to arguments made by violent extremist groups. For example, a documentary by Breakthrough Media titled “Mayor of Mogadishu” follows the everyday life of the mayor, highlighting the choices he makes and the way he runs the city (Breakthrough, 2016). This documentary helped to reinforce the

message that the Somali government was turning around the country and dedicated to making real change in their community and country.

However, it should be noted that experts at the workshop in Kigali also discussed the ambiguity of utilizing political leaders for countering the narrative of violent extremism in East Africa. First, the political narratives by violent extremist groups accusing political leaders of corruption and/or inability to govern may contain elements of truth, meaning a political leader delivering that message may not be credible to the target audience. Second, public opinions and perceptions of political leaders can change from day to day—meaning that a message that is delivered by a political leader may be undermined if the public perception shifts to the negative. When the message is as important as countering the narrative of violent extremism, it may be more useful to choose a messenger that does not have the potential to undermine the campaign at a later stage.

## 6 DEVELOP THE CONTENT AND LOGIC OF THE MESSAGE

The next step is to identify the content of the counter-message that is being delivered. Experts at the Kigali workshop also discussed taking a layered approach to content development, to mean exposing the target audience to different content across multiple platforms. For more on this approach, see Step 7. Some different types of counter-narrative content are described in more detail below:

### POSITIVE AND ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES

These counter-narratives are proactive and alternative messages that are more attractive than terrorism. Positive and alternative narratives are most effective when they provide an alternative action to address grievances. Below are some examples:

#### AMANI KWANZA

Amani Kwanza (#AmaniKwanza), meaning “peace is priority” was a campaign run by the Global Peace Foundation that aims to place peace as the number one priority amongst youth. The campaign encouraged the community to speak about how they would protect peace during the election period in Tanzania.

Country: Tanzania

<https://bit.ly/2sal5ec>



#### KUNDUBURUNDI

This campaign titled “Kunduburundi” or “Esteemed Burundi” by Alkeza.net calls on Burundian youth to love and value their homeland. The campaign featured messages on T-shirts to encourage youth to love their country, build it, edify it, and not destroy it.

Country: Burundi

<https://bit.ly/2MBWQzV>



### SOCIAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

This type of counter-narrative appeals to the “pull” factors that may impact an individual at an emotional or psychological level. This has previously been described as “emotional and ethical” in past How-To Guides. Below are some examples:

#### DESTROYED LIVES

The “Destroyed Lives” campaign highlights the stories of mothers of victims of Al-Shabaab attacks. The video, by the Anti-Tribalism Movement, seeks to appeal to the emotions of individuals who might be seeking to join terrorist groups by highlighting the effects on the mothers—who are highly cherished in society.

Country: Somalia

<https://bit.ly/1B1vSK9>



#### #INSOLIDARITY

In this video through YADEN’s #insolidarity campaign, two young women from Kwale County share their stories and encounters with terrorism. They talk about how youth have been recruited for the terrorist groups and the dangers their community faces with respect to violent extremism.

Country: Kenya

<https://bit.ly/2t4Yge3>



### ETHNIC AND TRIBAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

These counter-narratives seek to overcome ethnic and tribal differences by finding common solutions or common interests. Below is an example:

#### SOUTH SUDAN: TWO TRIBES REBUILD WHAT VIOLENCE DEMOLISHED

In the video titled “South Sudan: Two tribes rebuild what violence demolished,” Search for Common Ground started a reconciliation program for the Madi and Acholi tribes, which included radio programs and in-person community dialogues. The video outlines ways in which the program brought together different community actors to find common solutions to community tensions.

Country: South Sudan



<https://bit.ly/2IWiiKm>

### POLITICAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

Below are some examples of counter-narratives that address political grievances and ideologies:

#### MAYOR OF MOGADISHU

The film “Mayor of Mogadishu” looks at the mayor in his everyday life to show what it is like to have the responsibility of the city. It promotes the idea that the government of Mogadishu is capable of decision-making and good governance.

Country: Somalia



<https://bit.ly/2GUsdSf>

#### HUGUETTE LABELLE

The Chair of the Board of Transparency International, Huguette Labelle, speaks about Rwanda being ranked the least corrupt country in Africa in 2013. Highlighting this political fact reduces the ability of violent extremist groups to identify corruption as a reason to join their cause in Rwanda.

Country: Rwanda



<https://bit.ly/2t4LA78>

### RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

This type of counter-narrative refutes the religious claims and provides interpretations of the religious text that do not justify violence. Below are some examples:

#### RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN MOMBASA AND NAIROBI

The Hanns Seidel Foundation and Well Told Story investigated reasons for religious intolerance in Mombasa and Nairobi. They found that conflicts between Muslims and Christians are often imposed by outsiders. This undermines messages that violent extremists use to divide communities based on faith. The results of the research and interviews were turned into a comic.

Country: Kenya



<https://bit.ly/2HXmThH>

#### LIFE IN ISLAM

Authored by Ugandan Sheikh Nuwagaba Muhsin Kaduyu, this video message is part of the ‘Life In Islam’ series aimed at informing Ugandan Muslims how to positively impact their communities. This video is specifically focusing on the proper upbringing of the children from a Muslim perspective.

Country: Uganda



<https://bit.ly/2KWQ6sz>

#### ANNUAL NATIONAL INTERFAITH HARMONY WALK

The Annual National Interfaith Harmony Walk is the largest youth-led interfaith event organized by Allied Muslim Youth Uganda every February during the UN celebration of interfaith Harmony Week. It brings together young people, especially students, to engage each other in activities that build trust and foster mutual understanding by working towards the common goal of interfaith cooperation.

Activities included: a public lecture, inter-generational dialogues, the Harmony Walk, blood donation, community service, interfaith games, inspirational talks, and poetry.

Country: Uganda



<https://bit.ly/2LwJUe4>

### ECONOMIC AND VOCATIONAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

This type of counter-narrative provides economic justifications for not joining terrorist groups or economic alternatives such as employment or job training. Below is an example:

#### CENTER FOR CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE & PEACEBUILDING

The Stability Fund opened the Center for Conflict, Governance & Peacebuilding at the City University in Mogadishu. The Center offers fully-paid summer internships and offers course materials to prepare the next generation of leaders in Somalia.

Country: Somalia



<https://bit.ly/2thS3ep>  
<https://bit.ly/2lQRfqr>


## 7 IDENTIFY THE MEDIUM(S) THROUGH WHICH THE MESSAGE WILL BE DISSEMINATED

The mechanism by which the counter-narrative or campaign is disseminated can be crucial to ensuring the campaign's effectiveness. The medium should be one that reaches the target audience in a natural and simple way and one that the target audience uses regularly. In the East Africa, online forms of communication are not as common when compared to the rest of the world, and therefore offline channels of communication may be the most effective when it comes to countering the narrative of violent extremists. According to a survey by We are Social and Hootsuite, the internet penetration in Eastern Africa is 27% and the social media penetration is 7% (We are Social and Hootsuite, 2018). This is low compared to the global internet penetration (53%) and the global social media use (42%), as well as the internet penetration in Africa (34%) and social media penetration in Africa (15%) (Ibid.). However, the potential for growth in internet and social media use in East Africa is large, especially with significant investments in infrastructure and commerce from countries like China (Kiprop, 2017; Pilling, 2017). As such, counter-narrative campaigns should assess the realities of appropriate mediums in East Africa in the present, but also look to the future of technology that has the potential to expand in the region. Mediums useful for the East African context include:

### FACE-TO-FACE ENGAGEMENT

*In East Africa, radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism primarily take place offline, in face-to-face conversations and discussions (UNDP, 2017). With this in mind, messages may be best delivered in person, which means the key influencers in the region (such as youth leaders, teachers, parents etc.) need to be equipped with the knowledge and skills to refute messages of violent extremism in everyday conversation.*

*In addition to everyday conversation, face-to-face discussions can also take place in a semi-formal setting. For example, in some East African countries, the "maskani" is an informal gathering place where ideas are shared, a sort of neighborhood gathering place "where adult men [meet] after working hours to gossip, drink coffee and play bao (a kind of local chess)" (Bakari, 2001, p. 179). In the Tanzanian context, the "maskani" can be political, especially in Zanzibar, but also associated with gangs or drugs (Russell, 2017). In Kenya, the "maskani" is also associated with drug use (such as shisha or chewing Miraa<sup>12</sup>), but can also be tea houses or cold drink shops. In Tanzania, there is also a tendency for the "maskani" to be utilized by the older generation. On the other hand, in Kenya there is an inter-generational mix of people that socialize at the "maskani" (Russell, 2017). It should also be noted that the attendees of "maskani" gatherings tend to be men rather than women (Russell, 2017).*




### TELEVISION, FILM, AND CINEMA

*Another medium that is useful for the East Africa region includes television, film and cinema. Where online mediums are not as successful, public film screenings that also are accompanied by audience participation or a facilitated discussion may have some impact on reducing violent extremist narratives. For example, the Watatu film tells the story of three men involved in violent extremism: Yusuf, Salim, and Jack. The Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSC) screens the film in forums of 200 youth in Mombasa, which is followed by a dialogue or facilitated discussion about the film and the outcomes.*



<sup>12</sup> According to Russell (2017), Miraa is the traditional name for qat, a stimulant plant used frequently across the Horn of Africa.



### RADIO PROGRAMS

*Radio is one of the most significant channels of communication in East Africa (Russell, 2017; Sika et al., 2015). Radio programs are a primary means of communications about important social issues and provide a platform for governments and organizations to disseminate information about key causes such as gender-based violence, discrimination or health issues. Talk shows are successful in promoting citizen participation and reach people especially in rural areas that constitute three-quarters of East Africa's population (Sika et al., 2015, p. 23). Successful counter-messaging campaigns conducted on the radio may consider including some element of follow-up discussion directly in the community. For example, fostered by the Association of Media Women in Kenya, women in Kenya get together in small groups to listen to radio programs on topics of interest and discuss the ideas presented during the program amongst themselves (Orlale, 2015).*



### SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS

*As previously mentioned, social media platforms are not as commonly utilized in East Africa when compared to the global penetration of social media. However, incorporating a social media element to counter-narrative campaigns can help to reach younger audiences, or supplement the campaign by providing an additional form of engagement. For example, in Kenya, a campaign was developed by Afrika Moja and the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism to raise awareness of violence in the community and to encourage youth to speak out about it, using the hashtag #ithurtsme. Another example is from Tanzania, where the Global Peace Foundation utilizes social media campaigns to accompany their events and programs such as the #AmaniKwanza (Peace is a Priority) or #VijanaNaAmani (Youth and Peace) campaigns.*

### THEATRE, ART, AND MUSIC

*There have been a number of examples of interactive theatre shows and music festivals that promote tolerance, inclusivity, peace and community approaches to preventing violence. For example, the Anataban Collective in South Sudan utilizes theatre and art installations to speak out against the violence in South Sudan and to encourage the community to express "I am tired" of the violence (Campeanu, 2017). In Burundi, the Pamoja music festival, held on an annual basis in the region, promotes peace and social inclusion through Burundian Gospel music (Pamoja Festival, 2018). However, it should be noted that the experts at the workshop in Kigali pointed out that the theatre programs and music festivals have been criticized as only public entertainment, and that they have not shown any evidence that the messages are leading to positive change.*



### WEBSITES AND DISCUSSION FORUMS

*While website and discussion forums are not very common yet in East Africa, there may be potential for their use in the future if the internet penetration increases in the region. However, in a study of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in East Africa, it was found that information provided on government and civil society websites was reported as out of date or could be found through other channels or sources (Sika et al., 2015). In this regard, websites and discussion forums are not a primary channel of communication in East Africa, and perhaps may only be utilized as supplemental to other platforms. One example out of East Africa of an online platform is [www.ivomo.net](http://www.ivomo.net) where young people have discussions in a safe space about important issues and grievances in their communities.*





**SMS, MESSAGING APPS, AND TOLL-FREE NUMBERS**

SMS over mobile phones is also an important channel of communication in East Africa, especially as a way of collecting information on governance issues and encouraging active citizenship participation (Sika et al., 2015). The active mobile connectivity in Eastern Africa is 61%, and WhatsApp is the most common messaging App utilized in East Africa, although Telegram and Facebook Messenger are also common (We Are Social and Hootsuite, 2018). This means that photos, messages, and videos that can be shared by SMS or WhatsApp might be an effective channel of communication for the region. It should also be noted that toll-free numbers are also a common way to invite public participation and discussions on an issue or to provide a “hotline” for additional information (Sika et al., 2015). In the East African context, SaSaa Media, a grassroots journalism initiative to generate positive and alternative narratives in Kenya, often utilizes messaging apps such as WhatsApp to share their content in a peer-to-peer style.



**8 DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION**

Next, a counter-narrative needs an associated campaign to help distribute the message. Some of the recommendations for strategic dissemination of messages include the below:



**Determine the appropriate language(s) of the campaign and ensure the message will resonate in the local dialect.** The original message is best delivered in the language that is as localized as possible but provides translation or subtitles for a broader reach.

**Consider counter-narrative campaigns that include an element of audience participation and two-way communication between the messenger and the recipient.** Campaigns with a feedback loop or an opportunity to discuss or debate the message may have more impact on the community and target audience.



**Utilize short, concise messages that draw in the target audience as an entry point.** Follow up with slightly longer messages and provide additional information and platforms for engagement when the target audience is interested.

**Link the timing of the campaign to existing events already occurring in the community.**



**Supplement offline campaigns with an online presence to provide additional information.** Consider including hashtags as part of the broader campaign and link to relevant websites and online resources.


**9 EVALUATE THE IMPACT**

Evaluating the impact of counter-narrative campaigns starts with linking back to the goals and objectives that were set in Step 4, and articulating the desired change of the campaign. Good evaluation of impact may also include ongoing monitoring and assessment of the campaign throughout pre-designated points on the campaign timeline. Monitoring, measurement, and evaluation of counter-narrative campaigns are important for several reasons:

**WHY MONITOR, MEASURE AND EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF COUNTER-NARRATIVES?**

- ✓ Ensures the message is being received by the target audience in an intended way.
- ✓ Ensures the message is achieving the goal or objective that leads to the desired change.
- ✓ Provides opportunities to alter the message to better fit the context.
- ✓ Provides information on how to better craft future campaigns.
- ✓ Provides feedback to donors or funders of the project for accountability.

Hedayah has developed a framework for monitoring, measurement, and evaluation (MM&E) of P/CVE programs that can also be applied to counter-narratives in East Africa (Mattei & Zeiger, 2018). While explaining the entire framework is outside the scope of this Guide, the basic steps for developing good MM&E can be described as follows:



The below sections will highlight some of the key components of this process for developing counter-narratives in more detail below. This should not be seen as a comprehensive framework, but guidance on how to better evaluate counter-narratives.

**Identify Indicators**

Good monitoring, measurement, and evaluation involved articulating the measure of change through clearly defined indicators that can be monitored and evaluated over time. As was outlined in Hedayah’s previous How-To Guide for the Middle East and North Africa, there are three ways in which counter-narratives can be measured: awareness, engagement, and impact (El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017; Silverman, et. al, 2016). Some examples of indicators matched to a specific goal are outlined in the following case study:

### Case Study on Indicator Development

In Country X, there is a problem with the radicalization of youth aged 13-18 for joining a violent extremist group, Group G, that raids the local Village Y, steals crops and resources, and kills innocent people through violent sacrificial rituals. Group G aims to take over Country X and institute a political system where their selected elite group is in control, with the authority of their Spirit Guide. Group G recruits young people by forcing them to commit petty crimes against their mothers, and then threatening to expose them if they do not carry out the wishes of Group G. Country X also has a significant social media reach, and Facebook and Twitter are commonly accessed through smartphones. Radio programs are also commonly listened to in Country X, especially amongst women in Village Y.

#### COUNTER-NARRATIVE PROGRAM

Counter-narrative developers decide to develop a campaign to raise awareness of the recruitment tactics by **Group G** in **Village Y** in **Country X** amongst mothers in the community. This will be done through three channels:

1. Public community discussions in spaces commonly frequented by women
2. Social media campaign video that uses the hashtag #CounterGroupG
3. Public service announcements and discussion forums on local radio channels

**GOAL:** Increase the number of mothers that are knowledgeable about Group G's recruitment tactics.

#### AWARENESS INDICATORS

- Number of people that received the flyer for public events
- Number of "Impressions" on Twitter from target audience cohort
- "Reach" on Facebook
- Projected viewership of public service announcements on local radio channels

#### ENGAGEMENT INDICATORS

- Number of "Likes" for Facebook video post
- Number of link clicks, retweets or shares of social media video on Twitter and Facebook
- Number of participants attending the public community discussions
- Number of call-ins during radio discussions

#### IMPACT INDICATORS

- Increase in knowledge of recruitment tactics by target audience (mothers) based on qualitative analysis of replies on Twitter
- Increase in knowledge of recruitment tactics by target audience (mothers) based on qualitative analysis of comments on YouTube video or Facebook
- Increase in knowledge of recruitment tactics by target audience (mothers) based on qualitative analysis of discussions in public events and on radio

#### Collection of Data

Some of the relevant data collection methods for counter-narratives in the region may include:

- Face-to-face interviews or focus group discussions
- Surveys distributed through SMS or online platforms
- Keyword analysis of online comments or content
- Sentiment analysis of online comments or content

#### Resources for Evaluation

It is also important to evaluate what resources are available for data collection and evaluation. This could include time available for evaluation; funding; evaluator knowledge and training of the local context, collection methods, and MM&E frameworks; and technological tools for analysis.

## ALTERNATIVE AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE CASE STUDIES FROM EAST AFRICA



**CASE STUDY #1: "FUTURE LEADER" RADIO SHOW | Burundi**

The "Future Leader" Radio Show is being run through a Radio station called: Radio COLOMBE, affiliated to an organization called Centre Jeunes KAMENGE. It is the First Radio of run by youth in Burundi, funded and supported by UNFPA country office. [Click here to view.](#)



### 1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

**Push factors:**

- Lack of education
- Access to jobs
- Corruption & benefits through the Ruling party
- Ethnic manipulation and history of conflict
- Sense of insecurity
- Reduced opportunity for alternative voice, exploring issues, dissent

**Pull factors:**

- Revenge for injustices
- Sense of power, respect
- Belonging to something
- Job and benefits of joining a rebel group

**Enabling/Social Networks:**

- "US vs. THEM" narrative of the government opposition

### 2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The target audience are 16-35 year old females and males in Bujumbura and the surrounding areas.

### 3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The violent extremist narrative being countered is that existing power structures for jobs and making life decisions are limited, and that there is no solution except for the use of violence against the State.

### 4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

The show has several aims:

- To provide an alternative voice to change mindsets and attitudes by shifting the conversation about issues relevant to youth. The show aims to introduce new ideas and approaches to problems young people are facing. For example, the show often highlights entrepreneurship and job opportunities.
- For young people to feel confident and self-belief in advancing their own life prospects.



### 5. MESSENGER

There are several relevant messengers for this program:

- Successful youth role models
- Youth radio hosts (peer-to-peer)
- Experts on peace and security

Youth role models and radio hosts serve as examples of credible messengers for other youth in Burundi, and they are able to discuss difficult topics and debate key issues because they are facing similar challenges and situations themselves.

### 6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

The core message is that if young people feel more self-reliant and agency to take of themselves they are more resilient to being involved in violence or any violent groups. The aim is increased self-reliance, awareness and knowledge through radio and online engagement and interaction with role models and experts.

Some of the subjects for discussion on-air include: human rights, jobs and livelihoods, how to do CVs, conflict resolution, how to stay safe, how to prevent violent extremism.

### 7. MEDIUMS

The primary medium is through a Radio show. The contents are also complemented by social media and online platforms and websites.

### 8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

The radio hosts are trained on how to best facilitate the discussions, even when faced with challenging topics and debates brought up by youth. The facilitators are taught to steer the conversation to provide productive alternatives to violence or aggression.

The multi-faceted dissemination approach across platforms ensures that the main lessons learned on the Radio Show are supplemented by follow up discussions and interactions in social media and online platforms.

### 9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The metrics are mostly based on the scale and reach of the discussions:

- Number of people who participate in the phone-in shows
- Number of people who engage online – website and social media
- Number of radio shows aired

Qualitative metrics include the nature and number of testimonies, the range of discussion, viewpoints and voices involved, and level of interaction of participants that call into the show.



**ANTI-TRIBALISM MOVEMENT**

**CASE STUDY #2: MOTHERS' FORUM | Somalia**

This program by the Anti-Tribalism Movement creates a network of mothers in Mogadishu to prevent violent extremism through intervention and interaction with their sons. The program includes mothers who have lost their sons to Al Shabaab and can tell a powerful story about the dangers of violent extremism and terrorism, and the loss they suffered as a mother. The campaign takes a layered approach by targeting a key messenger through a counter-narrative campaign in terms of mother to mother as well as a secondary counter-recruitment campaign in the mother to son. One underlying assumption is that women feel empowered to speak out more against al Shabaab when other women with similar experiences are surrounding them with support and advice.

<p><b>1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS</b></p> <p><u>Push factors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Youth unemployment</li> <li>- Clan-based exclusion including political, economic and social exclusion</li> <li>- Insecurity of individual, family and clan</li> <li>- Environment of stress, violence and trauma</li> <li>- Lack of justice structures</li> </ul> <p><u>Pull factors:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Claim of VE groups of Somali nationalism</li> <li>- Family/clan protection</li> <li>- Job opportunities</li> </ul> <p><u>Enabling/Social Networks:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coercion to join</li> </ul>	
<p><b>2. TARGET AUDIENCE</b></p> <p>The target audience of the program is key influencers in the community, which are the mothers of at-risk youth in South and Central Somalia. The second target audience are the at-risk males, aged 14-30 years, that are the sons of those mothers.</p>	<p><b>3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED</b></p> <p>The violent extremist narrative being countered is that the family will get income and protection from Al Shabaab, and that Al Shabaab will enable revenge or a sense of justice for grievances, especially acts of violence against the clan or family.</p>

**4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE**

This mothers' forums have the aim raise awareness among Somali mothers of the warning signs and provide suggestions for how the mothers might dissuade sons from joining. Some of the sub-goals include:

- Educating other mothers on risk and consequences of other sons joining Al Shabaab, especially the consequences of a loss of a son
- Educating mothers about the warning signs of a son who might join Al Shabaab
- Creating a network of mothers who can provide guidance, care and support on these issues
- Creating concerned citizens who are critically aware of the general impact of al Shabaab and violence.

**5. MESSENGER**

For this counter-narrative, the main messengers are the mothers of at-risk youth. They are trusted by the target audience (young Somali males) and have direct access and influence on the target audience.

It should be noted that there are several risks to the messenger, namely that the mother, by speaking out, becomes a target and overly exposed to physical risk from Al Shabaab. In addition, there is always the risk that the mother herself is sympathetic to the ideals of Al Shabaab and is not able to dissuade her son from joining.

**6. CONTENT AND LOGIC**

The logic of the main message to other mothers is that the mother is a key component of her son's life, and that she has the ability to intervene and speak out to prevent her son from joining a terrorist group. The mother has emotional appeal because she knows how to relate to her son in the most efficient way.

**7. MEDIUMS**

The primary point of dissemination for this message is in person through meetings of groups of mothers, and face-to-face between mother and son.

**8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION**

The Mothers' Forum features a network of other mothers where ideas can be shared and support systems can be created to encourage sustainability. The conversations occur in the local language (Somali), and meetings occur on a regular basis.

**9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The activity was monitored or evaluated along the following indicators based on pre-post surveys:

- Mothers are more knowledgeable about warning signs of recruitment
- Mothers are more knowledgeable about alternative economic opportunities for their sons

The forums were also measured based on the growth of the network and the quality of interventions:

- The mothers' forums are growing in size (approx. 500 mothers who have been reached directly through this intervention after 2 years and there is now a core, ongoing network of 40-50 mothers)
- The forums are continuing weekly meetings in 3 main locations in Mogadishu with a larger network in the city
- There are some qualitative examples of successful defections from al Shabaab that were directly influenced by their mothers.



**CASE STUDY #3: PROGRAM ON PREVENTING RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM LEADING TO TERRORISM (PRELT) | Somalia**

This program is organized by the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) as part of their efforts to undermine religious extremist narratives in Somalia. A similar program is also being run in the Nigerian context.

**1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS**

Push factors:

- Presence of ongoing conflict and violence in Somalia
- Lack of religious knowledge
- Unemployment
- Illiteracy

Pull factors:

- False Promises (After life Reward, Group Identity, Saving the Muslim Ummah, etc.)
- Salvation from an Unjust and Corrupt society/ government.

Enabling/Social Networks:

- Attractiveness of Extremist Narratives and Charisma of Extremist Leaders

**2. TARGET AUDIENCE**

The target audience are key influencers in the community, namely **women, youth and traditional leaders.**

**3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED**

This counter-narrative tackles three main narratives of violent extremists (Al Shabaab):

- False Interpretation of Jihad
- Misinterpretation of other Islamic Concepts (Takfir, Hakimiya, Jahiliyya)
- Misconceptions about the life of the Prophet and Companions

**4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE**

This mothers' forums have the aim raise awareness among Somali mothers of the warning signs and provide suggestions for how the mothers might dissuade sons from joining. Some of the sub-goals include:

- Analyzing the local context and the individual pathways to radicalization,
- Detecting attempts for radicalization,
- Understanding the elements of radical and extremist narratives, and
- Acquiring the necessary tools and skills to craft and deliver an alternative narrative – using moderate Islamic teachings – so that communities would be able to contribute to preventing radicalization and extremism.

**5. MESSENGER**

The primary messenger (trainer) is a research and training center (CCCPA) with religious authority and connectedness to Al Azhar.

The key influencers trained in this program subsequently become the messengers. Here the community are credible because:

- They understand the complexity of the context and the effective means of delivering the counter narrative.
- They are credible and trusted.
- They are able to influence their circles and disseminate an alternative message.

**6. CONTENT AND LOGIC**

The content of the training course provides participants with:

- Tools to explore and understand the context of conflict, depicting how and why radicalization occurs within it and identifying the points of intervention for participants.
- An understanding of Islamic Law (Sharia), and addressing several Islamic concepts most notably Jihad, Takfir, Hakimiyya and Jahiliyya.
- An understanding how terrorist narratives and messages are constructed, including the way they frame the conflict and how they implicate religion in it, through "content analysis" of propaganda material (videos, speeches, and publications) of terrorist organizations.
- Tools to formulate their very own alternative, positive and inclusive messages of peace and tolerance that are rooted in a holistic understanding of Islamic traditions, founded on the correct and moderate interpretation of Islamic Sharia.
- A set of skills to be able to deliver these inclusive messages. This would include active listening, communication and leadership skills, dialoguing and the ability to form a coherent, persuasive argument.

**7. MEDIUMS**

The trainings primarily take place in a face-to-face setting. The content of the trainings could then be used by participants in schools, social gatherings and other online and offline platforms.

**8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION**

Some of the strategies for dissemination include:

- Alternative, Inclusive messages are crafted during the training and afterwards
- They are disseminated in the local language of the participants and according to their context.
- They are disseminated across the circles of influence of the participants in their workplaces, homes, social settings.

**9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

- Pre and Post Tests are conducted during the training to evaluate the knowledge before and after the training.
- Focus Groups are conducted right after the training to acquire feedback from trainees.
- Monitoring their progress and impact after 3 months, 6 months and a year.



**CASE STUDY #4: YOUNG FAITH LEADERS | Uganda**

This program by Allied Muslim Youth Uganda (AMYU) supports the knowledge and skills of young faith leaders to prevent violence and promote trust and relationship building by fostering dialogue among young people of different faith communities in Uganda.

It is part of the wider AMYU CVE projects that target students and youthful clerics who are most likely to influence their peers to build interfaith coalitions on secular and religious campuses and also develop social media campaigns or community events that promote tolerance and interfaith dialogue.

**1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS**

Push factors:

- Lack of interfaith competence
- Marginalization
- Lack of religious knowledge
- Lack of role models or positive figures

Pull factors:

- Sense of belonging
- Sense of identity and self-esteem

Enabling/Social Networks:

- Charisma of Extremist Leaders and Attractiveness of Online Narratives

**2. TARGET AUDIENCE**

The target audience for this program are key influencers in the community through young clerics from different faiths. The target audience of the message is the general youth population of Uganda (16-35).

**3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED**

This counter-narrative targets the isolationist rhetoric of "US" vs "THEM" between Christians and Muslims. It also undercuts messages of intolerance or hatred towards other faiths.

**4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE**

The goal is to equip young clerics with the tools to promote interfaith dialogue, tolerance and cooperation amongst each other and build resilience against violent extremist narratives.



**5. MESSENGER**

The messenger of the program is AMYU staff and select, trained credible youthful clerics from different religious backgrounds. The founder, Nuwagaba Muhsin Kaduyu, has significant credibility amongst the young Muslim population in Uganda as a young cleric himself. Once the young clerics have been trained and mentored on the key components of interfaith dialogue and collaboration, the messenger is the young cleric that has the skills to influence other members of his own faith to act with tolerance towards others, and to serve as a role model.

**6. CONTENT AND LOGIC**

The core message is that Muslims and Christians can live together, cooperate with each other and support each other in the community.

**7. MEDIUMS**

The message is distributed through several main mediums:

- Social media (Facebook & Twitter)
- Radio (talk shows by young clerics)
- Television or public service announcements by young clerics
- Events or face to face engagement (e.g. Interfaith Walks)
- Meeting spaces
- Training workshops

**8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION**

The campaign is distributed in the local languages as well as English. The various forms of the message are also accompanied by capacity building and mentorship from AMYU on a regular basis. The AMYU network takes advantage of new and existing community outreach programs, and also encourages the young clerics to disseminate their messages on their own platforms, such as during Friday Sermons or Sunday Sermons.

**9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

This program has been measured by:

- Number of interfaith activities carried out by trainees
- Number of online and offline narratives developed by the clerics through social media and other platforms.

**CASE STUDY #5: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE | Kenya**

This program run by the Community Development Initiative in Eastleigh, Kenya, and looks at how economic private sector can contribute to countering grievances found in the radicalization process.

**1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS**

**Push factors:**

- Poverty
- Unemployment
- Unfair resource allocation (between communities) and lack of job opportunities

**Pull factors:**

- Sense of identity
- Economic empowerment

**2. TARGET AUDIENCE**

The target audience of this project was for the benefit of disillusioned youth in Eastleigh, Kenya 14 – 25 year olds, male and female.

**3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED**

The violent extremist narrative being countered are two-fold:

- Ethnic discrimination and xenophobia – something that would have been exploited by VEOs or communities that were endangered of being divided following the Westgate attack
- Lack of economic opportunities and unfair distribution of jobs in the Eastleigh community

**4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE**

The goals of the counter-narrative are to:

- Prevent discrimination between ethnic groups
- Prevent divisions between businesses and radicalized youth (community partnerships)
- Provide alternative action through youth engagement in national conversations
- Provide alternative action through allowing economic opportunities and partnerships to develop

**5. MESSENGER**

The main messenger is the Eastleigh Business Community Association (EBCA) engaging with the local youth population. They are a trusted and respected association within the community, and give credibility to the job market in Eastleigh.

**6. CONTENT AND LOGIC**

The message emphasizes that the business community in Eastleigh cares about the future of its youth by providing job opportunities and making relevant connections for new jobs. The secondary message is that youth deserve to be heard by the greater community, including the private sector and government officials.

**7. MEDIUMS**

This program is delivered by the Community Development Initiative through:

- Face-to-face interactions between youth and EBCA
- Television, radio and social media campaigns around EBCA's actions and proactive programs

**8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION**

The program requires a good partnership between the community and the private sector, which is managed by EBCA. The messages are disseminated in English and Swahili through various media channels, but mostly taking place in offline conversations and job fairs.

**9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The program is measured through the following indicators:

- Youth attendance at organized activities.
- Social media engagement with messages about what EBCA were doing.
- Youth were updating local administrator about potential levels of violence.
- Frequency of the business community involved in other meetings

It should be noted here that one of the local 'super power' gangs participated in this activity because it attracted their attention. This was seen as a success because it was reaching the target audience of youth that were vulnerable to exhibiting violent behavior.

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**CASE STUDY #6: SASAA MEDIA | Kenya**

Sasaa Media is a project that enables young people in Kenya to get involved in a variety of creative activities. It is a program run by grassroots youth journalists, and managed through YADEN East Africa. The program features training workshops on producing content as well as platforms where that content can be shared after it is produced.

**1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS**

**Push factors:**

- Unmet aspirations
- Authorities not listening to youth / lack of 'power of expression'

**Pull factors:**

- Sense of identity and purpose
- Economic empowerment

**2. TARGET AUDIENCE**

The main target audience of the campaign is young people in Kenya who are at a personal crossroads aged 14-27, both females and males. However, the communications aspect of the project also worked with key influencers within the neighborhood in terms of several youth leaders.

**3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED**

The main violent extremist narrative being countered is that youth's voices aren't heard and that youth 'aren't worth it' ("Accounting for, and making every youth count." Violent extremist organizations like Al Shabaab can give a sense of belonging, meaning and worth to the young people of Kenya, so this message aims to undercut that claim and provide alternatives.

**4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE**

The goal of this campaign is to give the target audience a sense of meaning, purpose and belonging. This includes providing alternative action through positive activities and promoting a relationship between youth and government officials to develop constructive change.



**5. MESSENGER**

The main messenger are the local neighborhood personalities (leaders) to deliver the counter-narrative. The messengers are trusted, emotional, and have personal connections with the community.

**6. CONTENT AND LOGIC**

There are many strands to this project and each has a different core message. They are summarized as:

- **Creative process:** journalistic activity – improves critical thinking amongst youth leaders
- **Creative process:** video production – trusted with equipment
- **Creative process:** music creation – creative outlet for grievances
- **Creative process:** general objective of expressing views and getting involved
- **Hang outs:** promotes positive interaction between youth & group dynamics

<https://bit.ly/2JcUr0t>  
<https://bit.ly/2JcNPPK>



**7. MEDIUMS**

There are several main mechanisms for delivery:

- Offline (hang outs, workshops for creating the product)
- Online , through social media channels (Facebook, You Tube)
- Peer-to-peer dissemination (WhatsApp – infiltrating closed networks)

**8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION**

The program includes a production team and implementers that help to create the content as well as a neighborhood liaison that is important for tailoring the content to the context. The content is distributed across many channels appropriate for each medium (for example, CDs for music produced). The language used is Swahili, in the local dialect.

**9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The message was monitored in the following ways:

- Number of times songs or videos were shared on private networks
- How many people are inspired and create their own videos and music outside of direct Sasaa Media involvement
- Attendance at hangouts, and number of hangouts

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## **ANNEX**

### **Annex A**

#### About the Project

### **Annex B**

#### Counter-Narrative Details

## ANNEX A: ABOUT THE PROJECT

This project serves to expand Hedayah’s Counter-Narratives Library by adding a collection that focuses on East Africa as a region. This project aims to collate, collect and analyze counter-narratives in various local languages. The project as a whole, including the steps outlined below, is funded by the U.S. Department of State.

The project consisted of several main steps:



### About the Counter-Narratives Library

As part of its efforts to develop better practices and strategies for counter-narratives, Hedayah launched its Counter-Narratives Library in October 2016. The Library is a comprehensive portal where governments, practitioners and civil society can access content, toolkits and good practices to counter the narratives of all forms of violent extremism. The password-protected Library includes videos, movies, TV shows, cartoons, books, websites, magazines, blogs, social media campaigns, news articles and many other examples of counter-narratives.

The original collection focused on open-source counter-narratives to Al Qaeda. At the time, the project was supported by 8 countries, led by the government of the Netherlands, and handed over to Hedayah in July 2015. Prior to the launch of the East Africa collection, the Library features two regional collections (South East Asia and MENA), and one thematic (Daesh Defectors).

The key objectives of the counter-narrative library are to:

- **Establish** a comprehensive resource where governments, practitioners and civil society can access relevant information used to counter the narratives of all forms of violent extremism
- **Amplify** existing narratives against violent extremists
- **Promote** good practice sharing and provide practitioners with relevant resources and tools to counter the narrative of violent extremists

Hedayah’s Counter-Narrative Library can be found at [www.cn-library.com](http://www.cn-library.com). For more information about the Library, contact [CNLibrary.Admin@hedayah.ae](mailto:CNLibrary.Admin@hedayah.ae).

## ANNEX B: COUNTER-NARRATIVE DETAILS

Below is an annex of existing, open-source counter-narratives for the MENA region. The opinions expressed in the external content are not necessarily endorsed by or reflect the opinion of Hedayah or the U.S. Department of State. The images used are courtesy of the respective organizations’ websites.

EAST AFRICA		
1	PAMOJA FESTIVAL: TOGETHER	POS-ALT* SOCIAL
2	COOPERATION CIRCLES	POS-ALT
3	GOLDEN RULE TEACHING	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL
4	EAST AFRICA’S SUFI PATH TO CVE	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL POS-ALT
BURUNDI		
5	AMAHORO EGO (YES PEACE)	POS-ALT
6	KUNDUBURUNDI: ESTEEM BURUNDI	POS-ALT SOCIAL
7	ACCORD: SPEAK UP	POS-ALT SOCIAL
8	“WE ARE ACCOUNTABLE” - “FUTURE LEADER” RADIO SHOW	POS-ALT SOCIAL
9	KAZOZA KEZA: UN AVENIR MILLEUR	POS-ALT SOCIAL
10	“RWARUKA TURASHOBYE”: YOUTH WE CAN	POS-ALT SOCIAL
11	CITOYENS RESPONSABLES	POS-ALT
12	IVOMO	POS-ALT
KENYA		
13	WATATU	SOCIAL
14	MENTORSHIP OF VULNERABLE YOUTH IN NAIROBI	POS-ALT
15	RADIO PILOT PROJECT IN KENYA	SOCIAL
16	TEACHING ANTI-EXTREMISM IN KENYA	SOCIAL
17	AYUB MOHAMUD, THE TEACHER	SOCIAL
18	COMMEMORATION OF THE WESTGATE TERROR ATTACK	SOCIAL
RWANDA		
19	TEACHING AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM	SOCIAL
20	JUST A MINUTE: KWALE EDITION	SOCIAL
21	SURRENDERED TO EXTREMISTS	SOCIAL
22	REASON & PROGRESS WITH ME	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL SOCIAL
23	THE TARGET	SOCIAL
24	X KONVICT KONVERT	SOCIAL
25	#ITHURTSME	SOCIAL
26	FACE IT	POS-ALT
27	WESTGATE	POS-ALT
28	EXPLORING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG YOUNG KENYANS IN NAIROBI & MOMBASA	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL
29	THE ALTERNATIVE VOICES PROJECT	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL POS-ALT
30	TAFAKARI (SHINARS ARTS)	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL ETHNIC ECONOMIC
SOMALIA		
31	PORTRAITS OF RECONCILIATION	ETHICAL SOCIAL
32	KUREMA, KUREBA, KWIGA	POLITICAL SOCIAL ECONOMIC
33	FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION	POLITICAL
34	YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN RWANDA	POLITICAL
35	PROVIDING EFFECTIVE SOCIO-ECO-NOMIC PROGRAMS IN RWANDA	POLITICAL
36	QURACA NABADDA	ETHNIC

37	LET THEM HEAR YOUR VOICE CAMPAIGN	POS-ALT
38	PREACHING IN PRACTICE: ABDI SHIRE	ETHICAL
39	BAR KULAN RADIO	HISTORICAL POLITICAL
40	SOMALI YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP INITIATIVE	POS-ALT ECONOMIC
41	THE CENTER FOR CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE & PEACEBUILDING	HISTORICAL POLITICAL ECONOMIC
42	RECONSTRUCTION OF KISMAYO	POS-ALT ECONOMIC
43	DESTROYED LIVES	ETHICAL SOCIAL
44	LOST SOMALIA (STUDENT) ALSHABAB	SOCIAL ETHICAL
45	HUMANITY LOST: SOMALIA RAPPER	SOCIAL
46	HUMANITY LOST: SOMALIA MECHANIC-ALSHABAAB	SOCIAL ETHICAL
47	HUMANITY LOST: SOMALI JOURNALIST	SOCIAL ETHICAL
48	SOMALI YOUTH AND ELDERS UNITE AGAINST TRIBALISM AND EXTREMISM	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL
49	CREDIBLE MESSENGERS	ETHNIC RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL
50	SOMALI YOUTH DAY	ETHNIC SOCIAL
51	TUBTA NABADDA	POLITICAL RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL
52	DIGITAL COUNTER-EXTREMISM CENTER: SOMALIA	POLITICAL
53	SHABAAB MEN TURN KENYAN SCHOOLGIRLS INTO SEX SLAVES	SOCIAL
54	THE SEX SLAVES OF AL SHABAAB	SOCIAL
55	WHY I LEFT AL-SHABAAB	SOCIAL
56	STORIES OF SURVIVORS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SOMALIA	SOCIAL

57	RETURN TO SOMALIA: ALIYA'S STORY	ETHICAL HISTORICAL POLITICAL
58	THIS WAS NOT 'JUST ANOTHER BOMB IN MOGADISHU.'	HISTORICAL POLITICAL
59	DROP THE GUN, PICK UP THE PEN	SOCIAL ECONOMIC
60	IS THE REAL PROBLEM TO GROW BEARDS?	SOCIAL RELIGIOUS
61	THE POET NATION	SOCIAL
62	A BETTER LIFE THAN TODAY	POS-ALT
63	MAYOR OF MOGADISHU	HISTORICAL POLITICAL
<b>SOUTH SUDAN</b>		
64	SOUTH SUDAN: TWO TRIBES REBUILD WHAT VIOLENCE DEMOLISHED	ETHNIC
65	REFORMING MIRACLES: SOUTH SUDAN REFUGEES FIND HOPE IN THEATER	POS-ALT
66	ANA TABAN (I AM TIRED)	POS-ALT
67	#ANATABAN OFFICIAL VIDEO: SOUTH SUDAN MUSIC	POS-ALT
68	SOUTNA (OUR VOICE): SOUTH SUDAN MUSIC	POS-ALT
69	MALESH (SORRY): SOUTH SUDAN MUSIC	POS-ALT
70	#DEFYHATENOW	ETHNIC
<b>UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA</b>		
71	VIJANA NA AMANI (YOUTH AND PEACE) CAMPAIGN	ETHNIC POS-ALT
72	STOP THE VIOLENCE	SOCIAL
73	11 SHABAAB 'RECRUITS' ARRESTED AFTER REPORTS OF SECRET DRILLS	HISTORICAL POLITICAL FACTUAL
74	EXPLOSION IN NORTHERN TANZANIA BAR INJURES 15	HISTORICAL POLITICAL FACTUAL
75	TWO BRITISH GIRLS ATTACKED BY MUSLIMS WITH ACID IN ZANZIBAR	FACTUAL ECONOMIC

76	TANZANIA MOSQUE ATTACK	FACTUAL
77	RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN TANZANIA	FACTUAL
78	TERRORIST TRAINING IN TANZANIA	HISTORICAL POLITICAL FACTUAL
79	ONE FAMILY UNDER GOD	POS-ALT
80	AMANI KWANZA (PEACE IS PRIORITY)	POS-ALT
81	OKOA KITAA (STAND FOR COMMUNITY)	POS-ALT
82	AMANI HUANZIA NYUMBANI (PEACE BEGINS IN THE HOME)	POS-ALT
83	DINI MBALIMBALI UMOJA NA UPENDO (DIFFERENT RELIGIONS PEACE AND LOVE)	POS-ALT RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL
84	KIJANA BADILI MWENDO ACHANA NA TABIA HATARISHI (YOUTH ABANDON RISKY BEHAVIOR)	POS-
85	NAKUPENDA TANZANIA	POS-ALT
<b>UGANDA</b>		
85	ISLAM AND POSITIVE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT	POS-ALT ETHICAL
86	STUDENT CONNECTORS	POS-ALT
87	INTERFAITH YOUTH RETREAT	POS-ALT THEOLOGICAL HISTORICAL POLITICAL SOCIAL ETHICAL
88	AMANI LEO	POS-ALT
89	STORIES OF SURVIVORS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: UGANDA	SOCIAL
90	ANNUAL NATIONAL INTERFAITH HARMONY WALK	SOCIAL
91	KONY 2012: INVISIBLE CHILDREN	POLITICAL RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGICAL

\*Pos-Alt refers to the positive or alternative type of counter-narratives. Information in this column refer to the type of each of the counter-narratives.

ANNEX 2: COUNTER-NARRATIVE DETAILS

EAST AFRICA



<b>PAMOJA FESTIVAL: TOGETHER</b>	TARGET AUDIENCE	General Audience
	AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS	PamojaFest
	MESSENGER	Community Leaders
	MEDIUM	Social Media Page, Event, Blog

Swahili, French

Pos-Alt Social

MESSAGE

This message is used for the promotion of unity and social cohesion through music. The main message is transmitted through a music festival. Society has an oral tradition that makes music an adequate channel for delivering messages for social change. The festival is of a regional scale involving the artists of the sub-region in the consolidation of peace and the promotion of social inclusion. The music festival is held on a regular annual basis and involves the participation of community members. The messages conveyed aim to restore the relations of the populations broken by the violent conflicts and attitudes of hatred and revenge within the communities. The style of music is Gospel, and celebrates the culture of Burundian music for the region.

<http://bit.ly/2JZCxe3>





<b>GOLDEN RULE TEACHING</b>	TARGET AUDIENCE	General Audience
	AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS	URI - Horn of Africa
	MESSENGER	Community Leaders
	MEDIUM	Poster, Event

English

Religious Ideological

MESSAGE

This poster outlines key information about religions of the world in celebration of "Golden Rule Day" on 5 April. The poster encourages also the celebration of the UN International Day of Peace and World Interfaith Harmony Week. The poster emphasizes acting on the "Golden Rule" and provides quotations from each religion in support of treating others with kindness and love.



<b>COOPERATION CIRCLES</b>	TARGET AUDIENCE	General Audience
	AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS	URI - Horn of Africa
	MESSENGER	Community Leaders
	MEDIUM	Open Discussion

French

Pos-Alt

MESSAGE

The United Religious Initiative (URI) holds regular discussions in "Cooperation Circles" with youth on CVE, peace promotion, and development in their communities. The URI provides a place for youth to brainstorm about radicalization and counter messages.

<https://bit.ly/2M95dSP>




<b>EAST AFRICA'S SUFI PATH TO CVE</b>	TARGET AUDIENCE	General Majority-Muslim Audience, Seekers
	AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS	Pieter Hugo and Susan Dominus
	MESSENGER	Community Leaders
	MEDIUM	News Article

English

Religious Ideological Pos-Alt

MESSAGE

A group of Sufi clerics met in a three-day conference in August 2015 to discuss violent extremism in East Africa. The meeting of Sufi religious leaders signaled that Sufism in East Africa stood against terrorism, and over 300 delegates discussed religious ways in which they could battle extremism across the region. For example, the participants at the meeting suggested that Sufism offers an antidote to exclusivism, puritanism and intolerance.

<https://bit.ly/2Lym7e7>



BURUNDI



**AMAHORO EGO (YES PEACE)**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Hard Core (Perpetrators)

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** UNOHCHR

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** Website, Weblog, Event

French

Positive/Alternative

MESSAGE

This counter-narrative seeks to undermine a collective spirit of violence due to idleness, unemployment and political grievances in Burundi. In order to encourage young people's commitment to contribute individually and collectively to peace, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has developed the expression: 'Yes to Peace' as part of a campaign. The repetition of this concept, especially during an awareness day, has awakened the collective consciousness of young people and the UN agency has invited young people to turn their attention towards the restoration and consolidation of peace. Students and young people are invited to say 'Yes to peace' and no to violent ways of expressing frustrations.

<https://bit.ly/2ttEh8D>



**ACCORD: SPEAK UP**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** TUBIYAGE Association

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip, Event

French

Pos-Alt Social

MESSAGE

This counter narrative is a message intended to break the silence, to bring members of the community, through drama and theatrical plays within the communities, to express themselves on the realities, challenges and social scourges which hinder the life of the populations. Interactive theater provides an opportunity for community members to express themselves with words and gestures that exemplify positive and supportive behaviors and attitudes that can be adopted within society.

<https://bit.ly/2M5lp67>



**KUNDUBURNDI: ESTEEM BURUNDI**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Christian Life Ministries Bujumbura

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Event, Blog, T-Shirts

Kirundi

Pos-Alt Social

MESSAGE

The Kunduburundi message calls on the youth to love their country and build it, edify it, instead of destroy it. It draws upon Christian principles, but also presents them in a "cool" way through campaigns such as during events and on T-shirts that are distributed throughout campuses in Burundi.

<https://bit.ly/2MBWQzV>



**"WE ARE ACCOUNTABLE" - "FUTURE LEADER" RADIO SHOW**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Centre Jeunes KAMENGE

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Radio

French

Pos-Alt Social

MESSAGE

The Radio Program "FUTURE LEADER" RADIO SHOW" runs via a radio station called Radio COLOMBE. It is the First Radio of youths, run by youth in Burundi, funded and supported by UNFPA. It addresses underlying social conflict such as not respecting the property of others or not respecting the human rights of others. The narrative promotes and reinforces youth-led accountability of members of society and actively encourages individuals to consider the other as oneself.

<https://bit.ly/2ks980y>







**KAZOZA KEZA: UN AVENIR MILLEUR**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Leo Burundi

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Event, Video Clip

Kirundi

Pos-Alt Social

**MESSAGE**

A message used to anchor in the consciousness of young people and active people that there is hope for a better future. The counter narrative seeks to demonstrate that young people can engage and invest in a better future for themselves and their communities. In the context of Burundi, a better future includes peace, social cohesion and well-being in general (education, economic aspects).

<https://bit.ly/2KaZmPc>



**CITOYENS RESPONSABLES: formation des jeunes Leaders des partis politiques et de la société civile au Burundi**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** UNESCO

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Report

French

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This project was conducted by UNESCO under the House of Culture and peace in Bujumbura. The project included a national youth training workshop, and the message was used for the effective involvement of all social categories in solving social problems and rebuilding the homeland in Burundi. Some of the subjects carried out by this national youth training workshop included: promotion of mutual protection and mutual aid, empathy and compassion in the face of the vulnerability of the other and the contribution of members of society to help the most needy especially the victims of violent socio-political systems because what happens to the other cannot pass without consequence on its environment.

<https://bit.ly/2LDn8BA>



**"RWARUKA TURASHOBYE": YOUTH WE CAN**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Proverb

Kirundi

Pos-Alt Social

**MESSAGE**

Traditionally, proverbs in Kirundi demonstrate that youth is the force for a change in the future, they are discriminated against and exploited especially by malicious people who are targeting their own interests. This situation makes young people act under the command of the most awake who take advantage of their vulnerability and incapacity. This expression aims to awaken youth to demonstrate that they are capable today. Unity is strength, but this force of youth has often been oriented in the negative way where they are used for the interests of politicians and hard-working people. The message seeks to radically change this reality in order to prove that young people are active and constitute the nation's major force, useful here and now, for positive change.



**IVOMO**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Website

French

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

On this website, Burundian youth are able to start conversations with each other about topics that are important to them in their community, share ideas, and provide each other with information about opportunities. This platform provides an alternative space to address grievances and concerns.

[www.ivomo.net](http://www.ivomo.net)



KENYA



**WATATU**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, General Audience & General-majority Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** S.A.F.E. Kenya

**MESSENGER** Families

**MEDIUM** Video Clip, Article

Swahili Social

**MESSAGE**

The story of Watatu follows the story of Yusuf and his family in Mombasa, Kenya. Yusuf starts to read papers from As-Shabaab and wants to travel to Somalia. His family, left devastated and shamed, try to find a solution to him joining a terrorist group. The film was set up with the intention to start community dialogues, and the film showings include a follow up theatre performance that allows the audience to choose their own ending to the movie. Real actors play Yusuf's mother, sister and uncle to determine a new ending & give a voice to the citizens of Mombasa directly.

<http://bit.ly/2lIXISx>



<https://imdb.to/2loaiv0>



**RADIO PILOT PROJECT IN KENYA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, General Audience, General majority-Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** STRIVE HoA

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Report

English Social

**MESSAGE**

STRIVE HoA broadcasted four radio feature stores and four religious programs (hosted by moderate, educated religious figures) focusing on issues related to radicalization in Mombasa. The shows attempted to raise awareness about the techniques used by violent extremism recruiters. Additionally, by sharing family and victim anecdotes, the show sought to show the negative realities of radicalization.

<http://bit.ly/2JZCxe3>



**MENTORSHIP OF VULNERABLE YOUTH IN NAIROBI**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Sympathizers, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** STRIVE HoA

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Report

English Pos-Att

**MESSAGE**

In collaboration with a local CSO, STRIVE HoA, launched a youth mentorship program pilot in Eastleigh and Manjengo in Nairobi. The program identified 20 youth deemed extremely vulnerable to radicalization based on a variety of factors. Each youth was paired with a mentor. The program proved to be extremely successful and self-sustainable, with the one caveat that it is often hard to find credible and willing mentors. The most successful mentors were those who had been former violent extremists, as they could talk about the realities of radicalization.

<http://bit.ly/2thTr1t>



**TEACHING ANTI-EXTREMISM IN KENYA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** The New Yorker

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Media

**MEDIUM** News Article

English Social

**MESSAGE**

This news article is an example of how education is one of the most powerful weapons to counter messages of extremism, giving the example of the Kenyan context. Education helps enables young boys and girls to question extremist messages and reject them. It also can create discussions about violent extremist groups where recruitment is taking place and give students strategies to avoid their narratives.

<http://bit.ly/2K4n8cq>





**AYUB MOHAMUD, THE TEACHER**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Youth

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Eastleigh Community & CCTV Africa Story

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip


English Social

**MESSAGE**

Ayub Mohamud is a business studies and Islamic Religious Education teacher at Eastleigh High School, Nairobi Kenya. He was a top 10 finalist of the Global Teacher Prize in 2016. As a teacher, he has mitigated violent extremism in his communities through education, contributing to solving problems within his communities. The video clip narrates his story.

<http://bit.ly/2l4nH4g>

<http://bit.ly/2M3LQdA>



**TEACHING AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Youth & Communities at Risk

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Teachers against Violent Extremism

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

Swahili Social

**MESSAGE**

This source explains how one teacher, Ayub Mohamud, is fighting radicalization and terrorism in the classroom. The video exposes the narrative of Al-Shabaab that they are fighting the African states because of the invasion of the West, and provides some suggestions of how to counter that narrative through words and actions in the classroom.

<http://bit.ly/2tm9nPm>



**COMMEMORATION OF THE WEST-GATE TERROR ATTACK**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Youth at Risk

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Community Development Initiative

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip, Event

English Social

**MESSAGE**

This video highlights a series of news stories of how the local community in Eastleigh commemorated the anniversary of the attack on Westgate and condemned terrorism. The activity by the community suggests that society is not accepting of the use of violence, and the signs during the protest articulate that they do not believe that Islam allows for radicalization and terrorism. The event was hosted by the Community Development Initiative, a local CSO active in CVE.

<http://bit.ly/2llatqQ>



**JUST A MINUTE: KWALE EDITION**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** #insolidarity, YADEN East Africa

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

Swahili w/ English subtitles Social

**MESSAGE**

Two females from Kwale County in Mombasa share their stories and encounters with terrorism. They talk about how youth have been recruited for the terrorist groups and the dangers their community faces with respect to violent extremism.

<http://bit.ly/2yty9Tq>





**SURRENDERED TO EXTREMISTS**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Sympathizers, Seekers, General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** The Guetto Marvellous

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders (Families)

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

Swahili w/ English subtitles

Social

**MESSAGE**

This short film depicts a discussion in a family. The mother and the father are complaining because the oldest son does not collaborate in the house. The family is from the Mathare slum in Nairobi. Both parents kick him out of the house. A similar situation happens with another family, but in this case is the daughter who is kicked out of the house. The depiction of these two stories show how they may face discrimination in other settings in their communities and how discrimination begins. These two individuals end up joining an extremist group.

<http://bit.ly/2JZCxe3>



**THE TARGET**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Liberty Studios

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip


English

Social

**MESSAGE**

This short video depicts the story of a young man who is torn between following his friends and pursuing a dance career, or joining the extremist group. At the end he chooses to follow the extremist group, but it also shows the tragedy and sadness of him joining.

<http://bit.ly/2MDB6DU>



**REASON & PROGRESS WITH ME**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Liberty Studios, Credible Local Voices

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders (Imams)

**MEDIUM** Video Documentary

Swahili w/ English subtitles

Religious Ideological Social

**MESSAGE**

This video describes a program called "Credible Local Voices" that contests the market of violent extremist narratives in Kenya, to include CDs in Mombasa and Nairobi. The video explains the logic behind the counter messages, and can be useful to inspire new ideas for localized content creation.

<http://bit.ly/2M7LCCi>



**X KONVICT KONVE**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** The Real Thespians

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English

Social

**MESSAGE**

In this message, a young man leaves prison after he is rehabilitated. When he comes back to home, his family rejects him. In the Church, he is also rejected. He is practically rejected wherever he goes. A group of friends accepts him, and introduces him into a terrorist group. This is why he decides to create anger in a community by carrying out a terror attack. This video tries to focus on terrorist youth activity and how young people face risk to joining such groups.

<http://bit.ly/2ljqg0c>



**#ItHurtsMe campaign**

**MESSAGE**  
A campaign slogan developed together with ICEPVE to prevent violence in Kenya. It was shared over social media in youth circles to raise awareness of violence in the community and to encourage youth to speak about it.

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Afrika Moja

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Campaign Slogan

**LANGUAGES:** Swahili, English

**PLATFORM:** Social

<http://bit.ly/2K28JNZ>

**WESTGATE**

**MESSAGE**  
A music audio album compiling a playlist of different artists drawn from locations where young people are often recruited in Kenya. The songs are messages of peace to fight against terrorist groups' recruitment. The songs are generally mellow and relaxing.

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Liberty Studios, YADEN East Africa

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Music Album

**LANGUAGES:** Swahili, Pos-Alt

<http://bit.ly/2K5BlcA>

**FACE IT**

**MESSAGE**  
A music audio album compiling a playlist of different artists drawn from locations where young people are often recruited in Kenya. The songs are messages of anti-radicalization and of peace. Generally the songs are upbeat and lively.

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Liberty Studios, YADEN East Africa

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Music Album

**LANGUAGES:** Swahili, Pos-Alt

<http://bit.ly/2ta9qyf>

**EXPLORING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG YOUNG KENYANS IN NAIROBI & MOMBASA**

**MESSAGE**  
This research study conducted by the Hanns Seidel Foundation by Well Told Story looked at religious intolerance in Mombasa and Nairobi. The study found that there is little religious intolerance, and conflicts between Muslims and Christians are often imposed by outsiders. This undermines messages that violent extremists try to impose with respect to dividing communities based on faith. The results of the research and interviews were turned into a comic report.

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Well Told Story

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Comic Report

**LANGUAGES:** English, Religious Ideological

<http://bit.ly/2MHukNu>

<http://bit.ly/2I3zm3m>



**THE ALTERNATIVE VOICES PROJECT**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, General Audience, General Majority-Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** STRIVE HoA

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Report

English

Religious Ideological Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

STRIVE HoA recruited several imams and ukhtis and provided them with capacity-training sessions regarding the process of individual radicalization. In addition, they received training on topics of interest to youth. STRIVE HoA also provided training to youth so they could develop monitoring techniques to study how imams were tailoring their sermons and how the community was receiving them.

<http://bit.ly/2thTr1t>



**RWANDA**



**PORTRAITS OF RECONCILIATION**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, General Majority- & Minority-Muslim Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Pieter Hugo and Susan Dominus

**MESSENGER** Victims, Survivors, Defectors, Formers

**MEDIUM** Website, Art Installation

English

Ethical Social

**MESSAGE**

This series of photographs and portraits is featured in the New York Times, and includes the narratives and photos of both perpetrators and victims of the genocide in Rwanda. The stories show instances of forgiveness, reconciliation and the desire to move towards a more peaceful society. Some of the pairings are direct perpetrators of violence against the survivors. For example Godefroid Mudeheranwa is featured next to Evasta Mukanyandwi—Mudeheranwa directly tried to burn down Mukanyandwi's house, but Mukanyandwi eventually forgave Mudeheranwa after he was released from jail.

<https://nyti.ms/2of9U40>



**TAFAKARI (SHINARS ARTS)**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Sympathizers, Seekers, General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** #insolidarity, Shinars Arts

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

Swahili w/ English subtitles

Religious Ideological Ethnic Economic

**MESSAGE**

This narrative uses Shairi (poetry/rhyme) to convey the message, and it is captured in video form by youth using a mobile phone as part of YADEN #insolidarity P/CVE project.

The story goes as follows: there is a new religious preacher in town. He targets two young men working in the quarry with a message of religious and ethnic purification. Their radical ideas lead them to target those from a different religion and ethnic backgrounds. They have also been promised money in return to for their bravery. Later the authorities move in after the young men are persuaded by the community of their evil plans, reporting the recruiter who is arrested.

<http://bit.ly/2JZCxe3>



**KUREMA, KUREBA, KWIGA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Kurema, Kureba, Kwiga

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Artists

**MEDIUM** Facebook, Murals

English

Political Social Economic


**MESSAGE**

Kurema, Kureba, Kwiga (To create, to see, to learn) is a community art project that addresses social issues in Rwanda. It does so depicting these issues on murals that are designed by local artists and painted by members of the community. It is also an online platform on Facebook and Tumblr that promotes different forms of art in Rwanda.

<http://bit.ly/2M7dKFB>

<http://bit.ly/2ytDvhy>





**MESSAGE**

This article presents an interview of Huquette Labelle, who is the Chair of the Board of Transparency International. She speaks about Rwanda, since it was ranked in 2013 as the least corrupt country in Africa. This is useful to counter the narrative of extremist groups that may point to government corruption in Africa as a reason to join their cause.

**FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Eugene Kwibuka - The New Times

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** News Article

English Political

<http://bit.ly/2t9LPxY>

<http://bit.ly/2JQp8Jo>



**MESSAGE**

Rwanda has developed multiple policies to mitigate violence in the country. The government provides effective socio-economic programs such as mutuelle de santé which contribute to a better standards of living to prevent people from getting involved in conflicts. They have also set standards for peace education and anti-genocide education programs both in the formal education sector and informal sectors through museums and educational programs.

**PROVIDING EFFECTIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROGRAMS IN RWANDA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Government of Rwanda

**MESSENGER** Government


**MEDIUM** Document

English Political

[http://www.rdb.rw/uploads/tx\\_sbdownloader/EDPRS\\_2\\_Main\\_Document.pdf](http://www.rdb.rw/uploads/tx_sbdownloader/EDPRS_2_Main_Document.pdf)

<http://bit.ly/2JYr8LA>

SOMALIA



**MESSAGE**

The Youth Strategic Plan of Rwanda 2013 - 2018 shows how Rwanda has been trying to engage youth in building social cohesion, encouraging youth to participate in the political sphere as the future leaders country's leaders.

**YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN RWANDA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Government of Rwanda

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** Document

English Political

<http://bit.ly/2i3JJUQ>



**MESSAGE**

Quraca Nabadda is a social reconciliation programme implemented by the Somali Youth Development Network (SOYDEN). The 12-week programme aimed to consolidate the nascent peace in Somalia through workshops, counselling and offering a pathway out of the vicious cycle of violence for victims of clan conflict, crime, gender-based violence and terrorism.

**QURACA NABADDA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General audience, Seekers, General majority-Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Center for Research & Dialogue


**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Local Artists

**MEDIUM** Events, Billboards

Somali Ethnic

<http://bit.ly/2yqFtz9>

<http://bit.ly/2to72Dh>



**LET THEM HEAR YOUR VOICE CAMPAIGN**

- TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers
- AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)
- MESSENGER** Youth
- MEDIUM** Video Clips


**MESSAGE**

This video call by the Anti-Tribalism movement invites youth to express their opinions against hate and tribalism in their communities. The "Let them Hear Your Voice" campaigns are the submissions by young Somalis in response to the call. "Let Them Hear Your Voice" was a campaign that enabled youth be heard by presidential candidates where youth across Somalia sent a 30-second video with message stated: "We will be peaceful citizens who respect our government and the rule of law, and in return our government should: (1) Create job opportunities, (2) Provide better higher education opportunities, (3) Give young people a voice in policy decisions, (4) Tackle corruption, (4) End tribalism, (5) "End Al-Shabaab".

<http://bit.ly/2JTboh6>

<http://bit.ly/2tcg87b>

**Labels:** Somali, Pos-Alt



**BAR KULAN RADIO**

- TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, General Audience, General-majority & general-minority Muslim Audience
- AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Radio Bar Kulan Website
- MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth
- MEDIUM** Website, Radio Broadcast

**MESSAGE**

Radio Bar Kulan broadcasts news and information to Somali-speaking networks across Somalia and to the Somali Diaspora. News features recent terrorism-related stories as well as information on international bodies such as the UN and IGAD. The program also runs events for youth and more involvement with their government and communities.

[www.bar-kulan.com](http://www.bar-kulan.com)

<http://bit.ly/2yoGR5a>

<http://bit.ly/2Jyt2Me>

**Labels:** Somali, Historical Political



**PREACHING IN PRACTICE: ABDI SHIRE**

- TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience
- AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)
- MESSENGER** Community Leaders
- MEDIUM** Video Clip, Event


**MESSAGE**

This video clip highlights the story of Abdi Shire, who is also a poet and activist in Somalia. Abdi Shire is using his poetry and celebrity status to actively speak out against terrorism and violent extremism, and promotes messages of peace and highlights the problems of extremism in the media. The video features a graphic video of an attack on a graduation ceremony in Somalia where 30 people were killed. This attack was not only seen as an act of terrorism, but also an attack on education. The video also features a singing group, Qaylodhaan, which received a lot of attention in Mogadishu, and on Youtube, for their performances and songs for peace. Finally, the video also features a conference held by the Anti-Tribalism movement in Istanbul, Turkey to find solutions to terrorism in Somalia.

<https://bit.ly/1B1vSK9>

<https://bit.ly/2IUj94N>

**Labels:** Somali, Ethical



**SOMALI YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP INITIATIVE**

- TARGET AUDIENCE** Seekers, General Audience
- AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Stability Fund
- MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth
- MEDIUM** Article, Program

**MESSAGE**

In light of the lack of funding opportunities for Somali youth, the Stability Fund created the Somali Youth Entrepreneurship Initiative. Comprised of two micro-finance institutions and two NGOs, the initiatives enables young Somali entrepreneurs to start up their own businesses by providing competitive loans and other financial products.

<https://bit.ly/1W86E5G>

**Labels:** English, Pos-Alt Economic





**THE CENTER FOR CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE & PEACEBUILDING**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Stability Fund & City University

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Article

English

Historical Political Economic

**MESSAGE**

In October 2015, the Stability Fund inaugurated the Center for Conflict, Governance & Peacebuilding at City University in Mogadishu. The Center offers a post-graduate program in Conflict, Governance & Peacebuilding, with a 12-student annual intake. Students benefit from a fully-paid summer internship abroad. The objective of the center is to prepare the next generation of leaders, fully-educated in Somalia.

<https://bit.ly/2rT0cDi>



<https://bit.ly/2lQRfqr>



**DESTROYED LIVES**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Family

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

Somali w/ English subtitles

Ethical Social

**MESSAGE**

The aim of this video is to show and give voice to mothers who are suffering the brutality of the ideology of Al-Shabaab. Their suffering takes on different forms. These mothers have sons and/or daughters participating in Al-Shabaab, and their crying comes out of their loss, as their are killed by Al-Shabaab.

<https://bit.ly/1B1vSK9>



**RECONSTRUCTION OF KISMAYO**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Stability Fund Website

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Article

English

Pos-Alt Economic

**MESSAGE**

In collaboration with Dhasheeg Construction and Trading Company, Stability Fund began a pilot project with the aim of improving youth employment for Kismayo youth. The project involved the reconstruction of a major road in Kismayo, which connects Farjano and Faanooles residents to Kismayo's main market, hospital and schools. The project employed 200 youth and facilitated transportation in the town.

<https://bit.ly/2bcHZNJ>



<https://bit.ly/1KBPS5H>



**LOST SOMALIA (STUDENT) ALSHABAB**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

Somali w/ English subtitles


Social Ethical

**MESSAGE**

This is a report of an individual was kidnapped by an Al-Shabaab member. It shows some of the arguments of Al-Shabaab claiming that this group is fighting for the welfare of the people are faulty. While she escaped the kidnapping, this individual still receives threats from terrorists on a regular basis. She shows the consequences of terrorism, including victimhood.

<https://bit.ly/2wWT9Bk>





**HUMANITY LOST: SOMALIA RAPPER**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Video Clip



**MESSAGE**

A young Somali musician sheds light on the lack of tolerance among the extremists due to their inability to accept music. He shares his experience with violent extremism, including threats on his life, because of his music.. Al-Shabaab claims to be fighting for welfare of the people, but doesn't allow them to express themselves through music.

<https://bit.ly/2rVfcmZ>

Somali w/ English subtitles

Social

**HUMANITY LOST: SOMALI JOURNALIST**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Media

**MEDIUM** Social Media Page



**MESSAGE**

This journalist shares his story of receiving threats of death every day for reporting on their stories. The journalist shares his scars from when he was kidnapped and tortured by Al Shabaab. The narrative is powerful because Al Shabaab claims to be in favor of the welfare of Somalia, but stories of victimhood and torture suggest otherwise.

<https://bit.ly/2IRT1HY>

Somali w/ English subtitles

Social Ethical

**HUMANITY LOST: SOMALIA MECHANIC- ALSHABAAB**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip


**MESSAGE**

This young Somali mechanic was taken into custody by Al Shabaab. While the individual has now escaped to Mogadishu, he lives under constant threats and intimidation. The story shows the consequences of terrorism, and of living under fear.

<https://bit.ly/2ltgfE0>

Somali w/ English subtitles

Social Ethical




**SOMALI YOUTH AND ELDERS UNITE AGAINST TRIBALISM AND EXTREMISM**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers, Sympathizers, General minority & majority Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders (Imams)

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

**MESSAGE**

This project facilitated by the Anti-Tribalism Movement convened the Somali Imams at a Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, to issue a fatwa against Al-Shabaab. In this conference, both youth and elders came together against tribalism and terrorism in order to collectively speak with one voice.

<https://bit.ly/2k8QlYt>

Somali English

Religious Ideological





**CREDIBLE MESSENGERS**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Sympathizers, Seekers, General Majority-Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anti-Tribalism Movement

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders (Imams)

**MEDIUM** Website

Somali English

Ethnic Religious Ideological

**MESSAGE**

Credible Messengers is a project based in south and Central Somalia that works with group of imams to provide counter narratives theological to Al-Shabab's. The Credible Messengers host regular events in their cities and villages and discuss number of issues associated with Al-Shabaab such as suicide and how forbidden is in Islam.

<https://bit.ly/2Gybjsk>



**TUBTA NABADDA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** UNSOM Somalia & Somalia National TV

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** Video Series

Somali

Political Religious Ideological

**MESSAGE**

Tubta Nabadda is Somali government platform, through a video series, that regularly invites Somali clerics to share correct understandings of Islam and they have been successful by battling with Al-Shabaab with text references and made tint to Al-Shabaab religious appeal. The series is also accompanied by a hashtag, #TubtaNabadda.

<https://bit.ly/2DVzZdi>



**SOMALI YOUTH DAY**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Breakthrough Media, Anti-Tribalism Movement

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Website

Somali English

Ethnic Social

**MESSAGE**

To celebrate Somali Youth Day, the ATM created a forum where young people from different clans could come together and discuss how they could contribute to a positive future for Somalia. The forum was designed to harness the fact that Somali youth can and have played an important role in the recent prosperity of Somalia and encourage other young Somalis to play their part in the development of the country. In addition to organizing the forum, Breakthrough Media designed a campaign to take the key messages to a wider audience throughout Somalia. To do this, Breakthrough Media organised a billboard campaign within Mogadishu, a national social media campaign consisting of written, graphic and video content and a four-week radio PSA campaign. Breakthrough Media also broadcast the forum live on national radio and set up an inbound SMS and call service to allow the radio audience to contribute to the discussion.

<http://bit.ly/2K4nhg9>



**DIGITAL COUNTER-EXTREMISM CENTER: SOMALIA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Somalia Government

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** News Article

English


Political

**MESSAGE**

Somalia's government a digital counter-extremism center aims to dissuade young Somalis from supporting militant groups such as Al-Shabaab and Islamic State. The center carries out campaigns on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and state-run media designed to promote stability in the Horn of Africa nation.

<https://bit.ly/2D4Yj07>





**SHABAAB MEN TURN KENYAN SCHOOLGIRLS INTO SEX SLAVES**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**MESSENGER** Defectors, Formers



**MEDIUM** News Article

English Social

**MESSAGE**

The story of four Kenyan girls who had joined Al Shabaab highlights the hypocrisies of the group through their treatment of women. The narrative of Halima, a 16-year-old, illustrates how the Al-Shabaab fighters and leaders repeatedly raped and abused the young girls during their time in the group. They were also taken as wives, but were also forced to undergo an abortion when she became pregnant.

<https://bit.ly/2ly7Pw7>

**WHY I LEFT AL-SHABAAB**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** BBC

**MESSENGER** Defectors, Formers



**MEDIUM** News Article, Video Clip

English Social

**MESSAGE**

This news article features the story of Zakariya Ahmed Ismaili Hersi, a former leader of Al Shabaab. In his testimony, he indicates he initially joined to liberate the country, but eventually realized that his original mission was not able to be carried out through the terrorist group. He felt that the group had deviated from the original purpose, and that he realized the security forces were killing and arresting many of his colleagues. He defected from Al Shabaab to save his own life.

<https://bbc.in/1K2nFVU>

**SALAMA ALI COUNSELLOR FOR TRAFFICKED WOMEN**

**THE SEX SLAVES OF AL SHABAAB**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** BBC

**MESSENGER** Defectors, Formers, Victims of Terrorism

**MEDIUM** Documentary, Video Clip


English Social


**MESSAGE**

The story of four Kenyan girls who had joined Al Shabaab highlights the hypocrisies of the group through their treatment of women. The narrative of Halima, a 16-year-old, illustrates how the Al-Shabaab fighters and leaders repeatedly raped and abused the young girls during their time in the group. They were also taken as wives, but were also forced to undergo an abortion when she became pregnant.

<https://bit.ly/2LhL4dw>

<https://bbc.in/2qgh0YM>





**STORIES OF SURVIVORS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SOMALIA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** UNDP

**MESSENGER** Victims of Terrorism


**MEDIUM** Website

English Social

**MESSAGE**

This website contains the short stories of survivors of the violence in Somalia, including attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab. The stories summarize the physical and emotional trauma felt by the victims and survivors. Included in the stories are also accounts of family members who lost loved ones in Al-Shabaab attacks.

<https://bit.ly/2GxSciQ>





**RETURN TO SOMALIA: ALIYA'S STORY**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, General Minority- & Majority- Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Breakthrough Media

**MESSENGER** Victims, Survivors

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English

Ethical Historical Political

**MESSAGE**

The video follows the story of Aliya Durban, a music promoter from Atlanta and ethnically a Somali woman. The video follows her story as she returns to Somalia to discover her family's history, roots and the country of her mother and father. She experiences the destruction of the war, including the ruins of her old family home. She also experienced the poverty of people living in the ruins of her family's old house—internally displaced people. Aliya's experience highlights both the positive and negative aspects of life in Somalia from the perspective of someone who has grown up in the West.

<https://bit.ly/2INr2dm>



**DROP THE GUN, PICK UP THE PEN**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Perpetrators

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Elman Peace

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English

Social Economic

**MESSAGE**

This program focuses on the disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration of young women and men that have participated in armed conflict in Somalia since the 1990's. The focus on the program is the reintegration of child soldiers and youth. The program uses community work and employment skills as part of the reintegration strategy.

<https://bit.ly/2lylfag>

<https://bit.ly/2kcnYt1>



**THIS WAS NOT 'JUST ANOTHER BOMB IN MOGADISHU.' IT WILL DESTROY AL-SHEBAAB**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Sympathizers, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Abdirahman Omar Osman (Engineer Yarisow)

**MESSENGER** Victims, Survivors

**MEDIUM** Newspaper Article

English

Historical Political

**MESSAGE**

After a large truck bomb exploded in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017, the community in Somalia is devastated, but also more resilient against Al-Shabaab. The bombing killed over 350 people, and according to the author, has diminished the support of Al-Shabaab in the country. The community response against the attack was to donate a significant amount of blood. A civil society coordination effort (#Gurmad252) was also active to support the victims of the attack. Medical supplies were flown in by local and international airlines to help with some of the relief efforts. Protests against Al-Shabaab also occurred the 2 days after the attack, demonstrating resilience. Former al-Shabaab leader, Abu Mansur Mukhtar Robow, was one of the blood donors, and condemned his former organization for attacking the "children of the nation."

<https://bit.ly/2KWESqc>



**IS THE REAL PROBLEM TO GROW BEARDS?**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** Justifiers, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Al Awsat

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Article

Article

Social Religious

**MESSAGE**

The article discusses the long standing crisis in Somalia. The author ridicules Somali Islamist leader in the Islamic party, at a press conference, who despite the crisis the country is going through demanded that all people should grow a beard and shave their moustache as compulsory set of laws of their religion.

<https://bit.ly/2rYt0Mw>





**THE POET NATION**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Poet Nation

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Website

English

Social

**MESSAGE**

The website's goal is to engage the Somali youth, including the diaspora from around the world, through poetry, music and storytelling. The website intends to be a platform for positive conversations that promote peace, harmony and traditional Somali values to the young generation.

<http://thepoetnation.com/>



**MAYOR OF MOGADISHU**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Breakthrough Media

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English

Historical Political

**MESSAGE**

The film "Mayor of Mogadishu" follows the mayor in his everyday government responsibilities to show what it is like to run the city. The video features interviews and explanations of government decisions by the mayor. It also highlights a street festival hosted in Mogadishu to celebrate Somali culture, music and traditions as a way to bring the city together.

<https://bit.ly/2GUsdSf>



**SOUTH SUDAN**



**A BETTER LIFE THAN TODAY**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Stability Fund, BBC Media Action websites

**MESSENGER** Youth

**MEDIUM** Article

Somali

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

The Stability Fund, in collaboration with BBC Media Action Service, have partnered to create an interactive radio drama for young Somalis, in which listeners can vote to decide the fate of the characters. The show is called *Maalmo Dhama Maanta* (A better Life than Today). The storyline is centered on young Somalis who dream of a better future. The drama touches on topics such as politics, migration, the economy, and governance. The show airs on Radio Hargeisa, Radio Goobjoog, and Radio Garowe.

<https://bit.ly/2KFX4Ei>

<https://bbc.in/2oGxTZ8>



**SOUTH SUDAN: TWO TRIBES REBUILD WHAT VIOLENCE DEMOLISHED**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Search for Common Ground

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English

Ethnic

**MESSAGE**

This video highlights a program conducted by Search for Common Ground in South Sudan in 2015. The program started a reconciliation process between the Madi and Acholi tribes, and radio programs and community dialogues have continued the process. The program identified interlocutors that were able to intervene in the conflict and brought them together to find common solutions to tensions in the community.

<https://bit.ly/2lWiikm>



SOUTH SUDAN



PERFORMING MIRACLES: SOUTH SUDAN REFUGEES FIND HOPE IN THEATER

TARGET AUDIENCE General Audience

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS Search for Common Ground

MESSENGER

Community Leaders, Actors

MEDIUM

Video Clip


English

Pos-Alt

MESSAGE

This video describes a program in refugee camps for South Sudanese in Kenya where individuals are using participatory theatre to express grievances and start discussions about difficult topics. The theatre shows also provide an opportunity for the individuals in the camps to find solutions together. The theatre stories are based on true events & allow the audience to respond to what is happening on stage, and even make decisions on how the performance ends.

<https://bit.ly/2d27r1l>



#ANATABAN OFFICIAL VIDEO: SOUTH SUDAN MUSIC

TARGET AUDIENCE General Audience, Seekers

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS Anataban Collective

MESSENGER

Community Leaders, Artists

MEDIUM

Song, Music Video

Arabic (South Sudanese)

Pos-Alt

MESSAGE

This song created by the Anataban collective examines the war-torn country and all that is necessary to make changes for a brighter future in South Sudan. The song also is accompanied by the hashtag #Anataban.

<https://bit.ly/2MhYNk1>



ANA TABAN (I AM TIRED)

TARGET AUDIENCE General Audience, Seekers

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS Anataban Collective

MESSENGER

Community Leaders, Artists

MEDIUM

News Article, Photos, Social Media Campaign

English Arabic

Pos-Alt

MESSAGE

The Anataban Collective uses graffiti, theatre, sculpture and poetry to spread their message of peace. Their murals made by members of the collective, and they are seen on walls in Juba, South Sudan. The project started in September 2016 when South Sudanese artists and activists joined forces to bring an end to the violence that has been troubling the world's newest country since 2013. The movement is accompanied by a corresponding hashtag, #Anataban, which has become popular amongst youth in South Sudan.

<https://reut.rs/2lZrCUm>

<https://reut.rs/2t9C5AG>

<https://bit.ly/2lU3vXm>



SOUTNA (OUR VOICE): SOUTH SUDAN MUSIC

TARGET AUDIENCE General Audience, Seekers

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS Anataban Collective

MESSENGER

Community Leaders, Artists

MEDIUM

Song, Music Video

English Arabic (South Sudanese)

Pos-Alt

MESSAGE

This song created by the Anataban collective highlights the call from the youth for peace in South Sudan. The message is aimed at leaders of South Sudan to end the violence, war, injustice and poverty. The song also is accompanied by the hashtags #Anataban and #BloodShed-Free2017.

<https://bit.ly/2LhotxG>





**MALESH (SORRY): SOUTH SUDAN MUSIC**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Anataban Collective

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Artists

**MEDIUM** Song, Music Video

English Arabic (South Sudanese) Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This song created by the Anataban collective looks at the wrongdoings that South Sudanese have committed against each other, including violence, war and murder. The song promotes healing, forgiveness and reconciliation. The song also is accompanied by the hashtag #Anataban.

<https://bit.ly/2KeBK9i>

**UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA**



**VIJANA NA AMANI (YOUTH AND PEACE) CAMPAIGN**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, General-majority & general-minority Muslim audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Global Peace Foundation

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Event, Program, Social Media

English Swahili Ethnic Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This message was intended to target identity-based conflict and violent extremism in Tanzania, who constitute 60% of the population. The Vijana Na Amani peace campaign seeks to encourage education, sensitization, leadership and capacity-building through a campaign for peace by the youth themselves.

<https://bit.ly/2LnDYnK>

<https://bit.ly/2J2gciH>

<https://bit.ly/2KKZeTl>



**#DEFYHATENOW**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** #defyhatenow

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Website

English Ethnic

**MESSAGE**

#DefyHateNow is a peacebuilding project that undermines hate speech and seeks to strengthen mobilizing actions of youth that promote peace and non-violence. The project utilizes online and offline techniques and aims to enhance awareness and knowledge of social media tools in South Sudanese youth.

<https://bit.ly/2K6T2JH>



**STOP THE VIOLENCE**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Justifiers, Sympathizers, General majority-Muslim audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Zanzibar Youth Forum

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Poster, Brochure

English Swahili Social

**MESSAGE**

These posters and brochures by Zanzibar Youth Forum advocate for stopping violent conflict. They provide examples of healthy ways of managing conflict that do not lead to violence. They also provide suggestions for successful conflict resolution in a non-violent way.





**11 SHABAAB 'RECRUITS' ARRESTED AFTER REPORTS OF SECRET DRILLS**

English

Historical Political Factual

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Abdallah Bakari

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** News Article

**MESSAGE**

A news article based on police in the Mt-wara region in Tanzania. The police arrested 11 Al-Shabaab recruits in possession of 25 digital video discs (DVDs) featuring Al-Shabaab training manuals. This article can be a potential deterrent for individuals that might be interested in Al-Shabaab propaganda and warns about the dangers of distributing propaganda in Tanzania.

<https://bit.ly/2x6SKMt>



**TWO BRITISH GIRLS ATTACKED BY MUSLIMS WITH ACID IN ZANZIBAR**

English

Factual Economic

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Katie Gee and Kirstie Trup

**MESSENGER** Victim, Survivor, Community Leader

**MEDIUM** Video, News Article

**MESSAGE**

This message highlights the negative consequences of terrorism. In this report, two British girls had acid thrown at their faces in Stone town in Zanzibar. The story highlights the experience of the British girls as victims of a violent attack. The YouTube video also highlights the economic consequences of carrying out attacks against tourists, stating that tourism is an important component of Zanzibar's economy.

<https://bit.ly/2s21LRZ>

<https://bbc.in/2x3KLjr>



**EXPLOSION IN NORTHERN TANZANIA BAR INJURES 15**

English

Historical Political Factual

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Reuters

**MESSENGER** Media

**MEDIUM** News Article

**MESSAGE**

This message exposes the dangers of terrorism through highlighting the negative consequences on tourism. A bomb exploded at a popular bar with tourists in Arusha. The attack injured 15 people. It happened when football fans were watching an English Premier League match on the bar's television.

<https://reut.rs/2lCsMWy>



**TANZANIA MOSQUE ATTACK**

English

Factual

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** BBC, CCTV

**MESSENGER** Media

**MEDIUM** News Article, Short video


**MESSAGE**

This message highlights the negative consequences of terrorism. Three people were killed in a mosque in the Mwanza region in Tanzania after a group of young individuals armed with machetes stormed into the mosque slashing those inside, including the Imam. The attackers were about 15 individuals and had covered their faces with masks when they stormed the mosque. According to a narration by survivors, the suspects displayed a black flag with white words reading 'Islamic State'.

<https://bbc.in/2lGbvXx>

<https://bit.ly/2x6V8CV>





**RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN TANZANIA**

English

Factual

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** BBC, World Watch Monitor, EuroNews, Zephania Ubwani

**MESSENGER** Media

**MEDIUM** News article, Short video

**MESSAGE**

People killed and more than 60 injured during explosion at a crowded church in the northern Tanzanian city of Arusha, Mwanza and Zanzibar, radical Muslims burnt three churches in Mwanza region because of claims that four Christians had burnt the Quran.

<https://bbc.in/2GJKXnA>

<https://bit.ly/2s5RjZ2>

<https://bit.ly/2J0bbY9>

<https://bit.ly/2GIGiSA>



**ONE FAMILY UNDER GOD**

Swahili

English

Pos-Alt

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Global Peace Foundation

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Social Media Page, Video Clip

**MESSAGE**

Recently, local adherents to extremism have increased tensions between Muslim and Christian communities. This narrative by Global Peace Foundation aims to undermine the inter-faith conflict through teaching young Tanzanians that they are all part of the same family under God.

<https://bit.ly/2LvL4H0>

<https://bit.ly/2J9VPR3>

<https://bit.ly/2IMfjeU>



**TERRORIST TRAINING IN TANZANIA**

English

Historical, Political, Factual

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Warrior Security; CCTV

**MESSENGER** Government

**MEDIUM** News article, Short video

**MESSAGE**

This news article highlights the consequences of joining a terrorist group through arrest and imprisonment. Eight women and children have been arrested on suspicion of being part of a terrorist training camp on the outskirts of Tanzania's biggest city, Dar es Salaam. It is the latest in a number of high-profile arrests in East Africa that have led to concerns that terrorists may be trying to spread their influence in Tanzania.

<https://bit.ly/2IFZJBx>

<https://bit.ly/2IE0QzX>



**AMANI KWANZA (PEACE IS PRIORITY)**

English

Swahili

Pos-Alt

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Global Peace Foundation

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Website

**MESSAGE**

Amani Kwanza (Peace is priority) is a Swahili counter narrative message that emphasize to give Peace the first priority. This message provides the community a platform of airing out their voices on how they should maintain and protect peace during general elections and after elections period. The message seeks to inspire and encourage all Tanzanians to avoid political violent extremism and maintain peace, the community are educated to ensure that they maintain Peace during and after general election.

<https://bit.ly/2sa15ec>

<https://bit.ly/2kqX9B0>

<https://bit.ly/2sa0vf9>

<https://bit.ly/2IJsD3K>





**OKOA KITAA (STAND FOR COMMUNITY)**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Tandale Youth Development Centre

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Social Media Page, Blog

English Swahili

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This message was developed to encourage youth to stop violent extremism and engage in activities that support development of their community. The main targeted group is youth from Tandale, one of the places most affected by gangs in Dar Es Salaam. The low-income area is characterized with high population density, lack of reliable basic social services, and most of youth are uneducated. The narrative encourages local youth to support their own communities and take initiative and action against these grievances.

<http://bit.ly/2MIXk3t>



**DINI MBALIMBALI UMOJA NA UPENDO (DIFFERENT RELIGIONS PEACE AND LOVE)**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Inter Religious Council For Peace Tanzania (ICPT)

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

English Swahili

Pos-Alt Religious Ideological

**MESSAGE**

This message intend to encourage Tanzanian to live as one family regardless of their religious differences. Additionally number of incidents has occurred in Tanzania over the past 10 years that has resulted into tension between Muslims and Christians such as confrontation over the destruction of pork butcheries in the Mwembechi area of Dar es Salaam, a conflict whether Zanzibar could belong to OIC in 1994, the incidence of police entering a mosque to make arrest in Mwembechai, clashes over the use of graveyard in the Manzese neighborhood in Dar es Salaam between Muslims and Christians, and the arrest of Muslim preacher by insulting Christian religion.



**AMANI HUANZIA NYUMBANI (PEACE BEGINS IN THE HOME)**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Global Peace Foundation

**MESSENGER** Community leaders

**MEDIUM** Social Media

English Swahili

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This message is used to promote peace from family level so that to discourage violent extremism in the community. The campaign aims to encourage ways to support families so that violent extremist ideologies do not take root, and family members protect each other against radicalization.

<https://bit.ly/2xbgeAf>



**KIJANA BADILI MWENDO ACHANA NA TABIA HATARISHI (YOUTH ABANDON RISKY BEHAVIOR)**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Weep Group/Okoa Kitaa

**MESSENGER** Community leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English Swahili


Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This counter narrative message conveyed to youth through short film video produced by Weupe group specifically to encourage their fellow youth who are living from most vulnerable community at Tandale and Manzese, Dar Es Salaam, and shared to the Youtube so that to ensure it reach as many youths as possible and change their bad behavior including to stop in engaging in violent extremism and youth radicalization.

<https://bit.ly/2kolYgJ>





**NAKUPENDA TANZANIA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Global Peace Foundation

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Radio

Swahili

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

“Nakupenda Tanzania” is a message through a song to motivate Tanzanians to love their country and be loyal to their country so that to stay away from all forms of violent extremism. The author of this song is Global Peace Foundation and it was recorded by one of the popular musician in Tanzania, Barnabas Boy, the song has been played in radios in Tanzania and also the link has been shared mostly through WhatsApp users.



**STUDENT CONNECTORS**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Sympathizers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Allied Muslim Youth Uganda

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Event

English

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

#StudentConnectors is national network of University Students Interfaith Platforms in Uganda working to promote interfaith dialogue and cooperation. Established by Allied Muslim Youth Uganda as part of their P/CVE program, the student-led initiative provides a platform for youth, especially University students, from different faith communities where they discuss mutually perceived problems, social and moral issues, the value of education, use and abuse of the doctrine of human rights, the exploitation of young women, child labor, etc as a way of promoting non-violent behavior and peaceful co-existence among individuals. The network is composed of members of Muslim Students Associations, Christian Scripture Union and other fellowship groups in both circular and religious universities.

<https://bit.ly/2GRuTAi>

**UGANDA**



**ISLAM AND POSITIVE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, General Majority-Muslim Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Allied Muslim Youth Uganda

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Video Clip

English

Pos-Alt Ethical

**MESSAGE**

Authored by Muhsin Kaduyu, this video message is part of the ‘Life In Islam’ series which is aimed at enlightening the Ugandans, especially the Ugandan Muslim community on how to live peacefully and positively impact their communities. This one is specifically focusing on the proper upbringing of the children.

<https://bit.ly/2KWQGsz>




**INTERFAITH YOUTH RETREAT**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Allied Muslim Youth Uganda

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Event, Video Clip

English

Pos-Alt Theological Historical Political Social Ethical

**MESSAGE**

Each year, Allied Muslim Youth Uganda (AMYU) implements interfaith youth retreats where youth drawn from universities representing variety of faiths engage each other for 3 days directly in small-group dialogue sessions. Together, they tackle the most painful and divisive issues defining their environments, sharing their personal experiences, reflecting on competing narratives, and challenging each other’s prejudices.

<https://bit.ly/2xeBF3g>



**AMANI LEO**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Event, Social Media

English

Pos-Alt

**MESSAGE**

This video is part of online campaign called Amani Leo means "peace today." Amani Leo is an initiative of the Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum (UMYDF) that focuses on promoting peace, delegitimizing hate speech and providing peaceful alternatives to the problems that inflame violence in Uganda and the world at large.

<https://bit.ly/2J6iNs6>

<https://bit.ly/2xcp0mt>



**ANNUAL NATIONAL INTERFAITH HARMONY WALK**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** AMYU

**MESSENGER** Community leaders, Youth

**MEDIUM** Event, Video Clip

English

Social

**MESSAGE**

The Annual National Interfaith Harmony Walk is the largest youth-led interfaith event organized by Allied Muslim Youth Uganda every February during the United Nations celebration of interfaith Harmony Week. It brings together hundreds of people, especially students, regardless of their nationality, gender, origin, religion, language, or any other status, to engage each other in activities that build trust, foster mutual understanding and cooperation by working together toward a common goal i.e. interfaith action.

<https://bit.ly/2LwJUe4>



**STORIES OF SURVIVORS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: UGANDA**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience, Seekers, Justifiers

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** UNDP

**MESSENGER** Website

**MEDIUM** Victims of Terrorism

English

Social

**MESSAGE**

This website documents short stories of survivors of the 2010 Kampala bombings in Uganda. The victims describe the trauma they faced and the process they went through to survive the attacks. They also talk about the reasons why they think the attacks were carried out, and potential community solutions to prevent similar attacks in the future.

<https://bit.ly/2Lz9bV1>



**KONY 2012: INVISIBLE CHILDREN**

**TARGET AUDIENCE** General Audience

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS** Invisible Children

**MESSENGER** Community Leaders

**MEDIUM** Video, Website

English

Political Religious Ideological

**MESSAGE**

Invisible Children is an organization that partners with community leaders on programs to empower local communities. The goal is for local communities to learn how to protect each other from violence, heal from trauma, and demand justice from their leaders in Central Africa. Invisible Children also offer multiple counter narratives through documentaries. One of the movies is a brief overview of the LRA Conflict. The other movie is about the commitment of the organization to fight against Kony.

<https://bit.ly/2KVxL0Q>

<https://bit.ly/2G05QeB>

## ABOUT HEDAYAH

Hedayah was created in response to the growing desire from members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the wider international community for the establishment of an independent, multilateral center devoted to dialogue and communications, capacity building programs, research and analysis to counter violent extremism in all of its forms and manifestations.

During the ministerial-level launch of the GCTF in New York in September 2011, the UAE offered to serve as the host of the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism. In December 2012 Hedayah was inaugurated with its headquarters in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Hedayah aims to be the premier international center for expertise and experience to counter violent extremism by promoting understanding and sharing good practice to effectively serve as the true global center to counter violent extremism.



**Hedayah**  
countering violent extremism